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FAIR USE HARBORS 
Gideon Parchomovsky! and Kevin A. Goldman** 
HE doctrine of fair use was originally intended to facilitate those socially 
optimal uses of copyrighted material that would otherwise constitute in-
fringement. Yet the application of the law has become so unpredictable that 
would-be fair-users can rarely rely on the doctrine with any significant level of 
confidence. Moreover, the doctrine provides no defense for those seeking to 
make fair uses of material protected by anticircumvention measures. As a re-
sult, artists working in media both new and old are unable to derive from 
copyrighted works the full value to which the public is entitled. In this Essay, 
we propose a solution to the uncertainty and unpredictability that plague the 
doctrine: nonexclusive safe harbors that define minimum levels of copying as 
per se fair uses. These bright-line rules would provide the clarity needed to fa-
cilitate countless productive uses that are currently being chilled. Furthermore, 
by providing an ex ante test for identifying uses as fair, these safe harbors pro-
vide a framework for salvaging fair use in the digital age. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Fair use is at once the most important and the most “troublesome”1 
doctrine in copyright law. By legitimizing certain unauthorized uses 
of copyrighted works, fair use aims to secure a delicate balance be-
tween the rights of content owners and the interests of the public. 
In its current form, the doctrine falls short of achieving this goal. 
To see why, it is necessary to understand the role and design of 
copyright law. 
Copyright law purports to perform two potentially conflicting 
functions. First, copyright promotes the production of new works 
by recognizing and protecting property rights in original expressive 
works. Specifically, the Copyright Act grants to content owners the 
exclusive right to reproduce, adapt, distribute, publicly perform, 
and publicly display copyrighted works.2 The rights of owners are 
formulated in clear terms and have been construed broadly by the 
courts.3 
 
1 Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1929) (dubbing fair use 
the “most troublesome [doctrine] in the whole law of copyright”). 
2 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)–(5) (2000). The section also recognizes the right of copyright 
owners in sound recordings to digitally perform the work. 17 U.S.C. § 106(6). 
3 For discussion, see infra Part I. 
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Yet the rights of owners are not absolute. The copyright scheme 
limits these rights in order to promote its second aim: ensuring the 
optimal use of works after they have been created. Thus, the law 
recognizes a privilege in the public to utilize copyrighted works by 
incorporating a general fair use defense.4 In theory, fair use should 
be a significant limitation on the rights of authors. It sanctions pri-
vate takings of intellectual property without requiring the payment 
of compensation. In reality, however, it is more bark than bite: fair 
use’s ability to shield unauthorized users is greatly undermined by 
the uncertainty that has become the hallmark of the doctrine. 
Since its inception over two and half centuries ago, neither the 
courts nor the legislature have provided a useful definition of fair 
use, nor have they devised a meaningful method for determining 
which uses are fair.5 Instead, the Copyright Act lists essentially four 
different tests for judges to apply in making fair use determina-
tions. It requires courts to consider the purpose of the unauthor-
ized use, the nature of the protected work, the amount and sub-
stantiality of the material taken from the work, and the effect of 
the unauthorized use on the market for the protected work. The 
Act does not indicate how to rank the tests in cases of conflict, pre-
sumably leaving this task to the courts. Unfortunately, the Su-
preme Court has consciously avoided devising an internal hierar-
chy among the factors, insisting that fair use remain “an equitable 
rule of reason”6 whose application depends on the specific facts of 
each individual case.7 
All this might not be of such concern if judges shared a common 
understanding of fair use. However, as Judge Pierre Leval has 
openly admitted, they do not.8 Indeed, the case law is characterized 
by widely divergent interpretations of fair use, divided courts, and 
 
4 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
5 See generally Pierre N. Leval, Toward A Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 
1105, 1105–06 (1990) (noting that the legislature provided courts with scant guidance 
as to how to decide fair use cases and that “judges generally have neither complained 
of the absence of guidance, nor made substantial efforts to fill the void”). 
6 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 448 & n.31 (1984) (re-
ferring to fair use as an “equitable rule of reason”). 
7 Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 552 (1985) (“[F]air use 
analysis must always be tailored to the individual case.”). 
8 Leval, supra note 5, at 1106 (stating that “[j]udges do not share a consensus on the 
meaning of fair use”). 
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frequent reversals. This state of affairs has prompted a leading 
commentator to conclude that the doctrine of fair use is impervious 
to generalization and that attempts to derive its meaning from 
careful analysis of specific cases are futile.9 
The Supreme Court’s decision to favor ex post fairness over ex 
ante certainty comes at a steep cost for potential users of copy-
righted works. As the law and economics literature has pointed 
out, ambiguous standards, such as fair use, invariably lead to over-
deterrence, which, in turn, will cause potential defendants to over-
invest in precautions.10 The intuition behind this result is straight-
forward: the more a defendant has invested in precautions, the less 
likely a court will be to find her liable. Accordingly, the ambiguity 
of the fair use doctrine works as a one-way ratchet that will in 
many cases lead to the underuse of copyrighted works. 
The overdeterrence problem is compounded by the nature of 
copyrighted works and the wide arsenal of remedies the law pro-
vides to copyright owners. Copyrighted works are information 
goods, and, as such, they invariably create spillovers (or positive 
externalities).11 Consequently, a user who incorporates protected 
expression into her work without permission from the copyright 
owners can never capture the full social benefit of the use but still 
stands to bear the full social cost. Moreover, plaintiffs in copyright 
cases can readily obtain injunctions and monetary awards in excess 
of their harm. The Copyright Act entitles successful plaintiffs to 
 
9 Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair’s Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1137, 1138 (1990) (expressing doubt that “the results in concrete cases can be 
made predictably responsive to a limited set of definite principles—certainly not 
large, general principles and not very often even more specific, intermediate ones”). 
10 See, e.g., John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on 
Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 Va. L. Rev. 965, 995 (1984) (noting that when 
the “probability [of liability] declines as defendants take more care, then defendants 
may tend to overcomply”); Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Un-
certain Legal Standards, 2 J.L. Econ. & Org. 279, 280 (1986) (similar); A. Mitchell 
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 Harv. L. 
Rev. 869, 873 (1998) (observing that “if injurers are made to pay more than for the 
harm they cause, wasteful precautions may be taken . . . and risky but socially benefi-
cial activities may be undesirably curtailed”). 
11 On spillovers and whether the law should do something about them, see Brett M. 
Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 257 (2007) (arguing 
why the law should not strive to internalize informational spillovers and other positive 
externalities). 
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the defendant’s profits12 and to statutory damages of up to $150,000 
per work willfully infringed.13 This means that while the benefit a 
typical user could derive from a small unauthorized borrowing is 
rather modest, the potential liability is quite substantial.14 
Users of copyrighted expression can respond to the uncertainty 
of the fair use doctrine by adopting two types of precautions. When 
transaction costs are sufficiently low,15 they may attempt to secure a 
license from the copyright owner.16 When transaction costs are high 
or in the presence of strategic holdouts,17 users will copy less pro-
tected expression than they are legally entitled to or refrain from 
using copyrighted expression altogether. While both responses are 
socially wasteful,18 the second is particularly troubling as it means 
that certain socially valuable projects may not be carried out. 
The highly acclaimed Eyes on the Prize documentary series, 
which chronicles the American civil rights movement, is a prime 
example.19 For over a decade, the series could not be broadcast or 
sold because the permission to use archival footage—depicting 
protest marches, bus boycotts, and confrontations with Southern 
 
12 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (2000) (stating that a copyright infringer is liable for any of 
“the copyright owner’s actual damages and any additional profits of the infringer”). 
13 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). 
14 And for companies whose business plans depend on fair use, the results can be 
disastrous. See, e.g., UMG Recordings v. MP3.com, No. 00-CIV-472(JSR), 2000 WL 
1262568, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2000) (finding MP3.com liable for approximately 
$118 million in statutory damages); see also J. Cam Barker, Note, Grossly Excessive 
Penalties in the Battle Against Illegal File-Sharing: The Troubling Effects of Aggre-
gating Minimum Statutory Damages for Copyright Infringement, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 525, 
545–49 (2004) (discussing the punitive nature of statutory damages for copyright in-
fringement). 
15 On the connection between fair use and transaction costs, see Professor Wendy 
Gordon’s classic, Fair Use as Market Failure, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1608, 1614–15 
(1982) (listing high transaction costs as a prerequisite to a fair use finding). 
16 For an excellent discussion, see James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accre-
tion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 Yale L.J. 882, 887–95 (2007); Mark A. Lemley, 
Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1031, 1041 (2005). 
17 See Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Value of Giving Away Secrets, 
89 Va. L. Rev. 1857, 1858 (2003) (discussing the effect of strategic holdups on bargain-
ing between rightsholders and potential improvers in patent law). The discussion ap-
plies with equal force to negotiations over copyrights. 
18 Any overinvestment in precautions is socially wasteful. See generally Guido 
Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents (1970). 
19 Eyes on the Prize: America’s Civil Rights Years, 1954–1965 (Blackside, Inc. & 
PBS Video 1986); Eyes on the Prize II: America at the Racial Crossroads, 1965–1985 
(Blackside, Inc. & PBS Video 1990). 
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police—had expired, and the cost of renewing the licenses was 
prohibitively expensive.20 
Yet even in cases where users elect to rely on fair use and pro-
ceed without permission from rightsholders, the practical pressures 
of litigation often threaten to derail these efforts before fair use 
rights can be vindicated in court. For example, Google recently 
launched Google Book Search, which seeks to create a searchable 
database containing the full text of every book in several major li-
braries (including those still under copyright protection). Several 
groups have brought legal challenges against Google, alleging that 
the project violates copyright law. Notwithstanding the fact that 
the leading precedent supports the position that Google’s use is 
fair,21 as well as the massive academic rallying behind the company, 
it seems likely that Google will settle rather than take the cases to 
trial.22 
In this Essay, we explore the possibility of reforming fair use 
through the recognition of certain types of copying as per se fair. 
Uses that fall within these bounds would not give rise to liability 
for copyright infringement, so actors who engage in them would be 
categorically immune from suit. Carefully tailored, safe harbors 
would provide much needed certainty to users and potential crea-
tors without unduly compromising the rights of current copyright 
owners. Thus, the introduction of a bright-line rule component into 
 
20 See Guy Dixon, How Copyright Could Be Killing Culture, Globe & Mail (To-
ronto), Jan. 17, 2005, at R1 (noting that the footage of protest marches and police 
confrontations remain under copyright); Lisa Helem, Civil Rights: A Televised 
Movement?, Newsweek, Feb. 14, 2005, at 8, 8 (noting that the footage of the Mont-
gomery bus boycotts remains under copyright); see also Colleen Long, Documentary 
Raises Copyright Issues, Cin. Post, Feb. 5, 2005, at A13 (noting that copyright clear-
ance issues also prohibited the use of “[a] touching and intimate scene in the film 
[that] shows staff members singing ‘Happy Birthday’ to Martin Luther King Jr. on his 
39th, and last, birthday”). It now appears that, due to charitable contributions of ap-
proximately $850,000, PBS has been able to reacquire a license to broadcast the se-
ries. See Press Release, PBS News, Eyes on the Prize, Produced by Blackside, Returns 
to PBS on American Experience (Jan. 14, 2006), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/aboutpbs/news/20060114_eyesontheprize.html. 
21 See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 817–22 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that 
the reproduction of copyrighted works for use as thumbnails in a search engine is a 
fair use under the Copyright Act). 
22 See Jeffrey Toobin, Google’s Moon Shot, New Yorker, Feb. 5, 2007, at 30, 30. 
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the doctrine of fair use has the potential to significantly enhance 
social welfare.23 
Since copyright law is a balancing act, we recommend that poli-
cymakers err on the side of safety and adopt a minimalist approach 
to crafting these new harbors. This can be achieved by setting fairly 
restrictive limits that are tailored to each particular type of subject 
matter. To illustrate, permissible reproduction may include the fol-
lowing: for literary works, three hundred words or fewer (and in no 
case more than fifteen percent of the copyrighted work); for sound 
recordings, ten seconds or less (and in no case more than ten per-
cent of the copyrighted work); and for films and audiovisual works, 
thirty seconds or less (and in no case more than ten percent of the 
copyrighted work).24 Uses that exceed these specified limits would 
remain subject to the current multifactor fair use analysis. Thus, 
even if our proposal were to be implemented, parodists would con-
tinue to be able to use a much greater amount of protected expres-
sion, as would certain highly transformative users.25 Its implementa-
tion would not diminish any free speech privileges,26 or otherwise 
alter existing doctrines. It would simply establish supplementary 
safe harbors that would shelter many users from expensive litiga-
tion and the vagaries of case-by-case decisionmaking. 
Importantly, implementation of our proposal can salvage fair use 
in the digital age. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, by pro-
hibiting circumvention of technological protection measures,27 
made fair use irrelevant with respect to the vast amount of pro-
tected expression stored in digital form. As many commentators 
have observed, the legislation gave copyright owners an absolute 
 
23 While fair use safe harbors found their way into the laws of Australia, Canada, 
and the United Kingdom, they have never been a part of the law of the United States. 
Moreover, they have received only scant attention from a handful of legal scholars 
who have summarily rejected them. See infra note 98 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing scholars who have rejected the notion of clarifying fair use with rules). 
24 For a full discussion of the safe harbor limits, see infra Section II.C. 
25 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 574–94 (1994). 
26 But see Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free 
Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 Yale L.J. 535 (2004) (arguing that fair use in 
its current form hampers free speech). 
27 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17 
U.S.C.). 
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veto over any fair uses of their works. 28 Previous efforts to recog-
nize a fair use exception in this context have failed because there 
was no ex ante way to differentiate circumvention of protective 
measures for fair uses from circumvention for infringing ones. Ac-
cordingly, lawmakers feared that permitting circumvention for fair 
uses would open the door for the lifting of works in their entirety. 
This is a classic example of a pooling equilibrium.29 Our proposal 
unties this Gordian knot by identifying fair uses ex ante. Thus, 
Congress could require content providers to employ protective 
technologies that enable end-users to access limited amounts of 
protected material that fall within the safe harbors. 
But what about copyright owners? At first glance, one might 
think that our proposal could weaken the incentive to produce new 
works. But a more careful examination suggests, counterintuitively, 
that it may actually improve production. As Professor William 
Landes and Judge Richard Posner have pointed out, if creators as a 
group had had it their way, they would have chosen to limit copy-
right protection:30 
[t]o the extent that a later author is free to borrow material from 
an earlier one, the later author’s cost of expression is reduced; 
and, from an ex ante viewpoint, every author is both an earlier 
author from whom a later author might want to borrow material 
and the later author himself.31  
Our proposal reduces both costs and risks for all creators. Thus, on 
the whole, it may increase the number (as well as quality) of new 
works. 
One final objection may be that the benefits authors stand to 
gain in terms of reduced cost would be outweighed by the losses 
they stand to incur from unlicensed reproduction by members of 
the general public who do not partake in creative activities. We do 
not find this objection compelling for two reasons. First, the nar-
 
28 See, e.g., Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 485, 
527 (2004). 
29 See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms 19–21 (2000) (describing pooling 
equilibria in the law). 
30 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright 
Law, 18 J. Legal Stud. 325, 327 (1989). 
31 Id. at 333. 
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row tailoring of the per se fair uses makes them virtually valueless 
for typical purchasers. Even illegal music downloaders are unlikely 
to take advantage of our proposed ten second safe harbor as a 
market substitute for entire songs.32 Second, as many commentators 
have noted, digital technologies have blurred the traditional dis-
tinction between producers and users of expressive content.33 To-
day, a significant amount of content is user produced, and “remix” 
is emerging as an important mode of production.34 We believe that 
these technological and cultural changes underscore the need to re-
form fair use along the lines of our proposal. 
The remainder of the Essay unfolds in three parts. In Part I, we 
demonstrate how fair use’s ambiguity upsets the balance underly-
ing copyright law. In Part II, we present our proposal of nonexclu-
sive safe harbors of fair use and examine the implications. In Part 
III, we address potential objections and criticisms. 
I. FAIR USE, UNCERTAINTY, AND OVERDETERRENCE 
In this Part, we position fair use in the overall scheme of copy-
right law and explain its vital role in maintaining the delicate bal-
ance copyright law aims to achieve between promoting the creation 
of new works and securing adequate access to existing ones. We 
then explain how the vagueness of the fair use doctrine undermines 
its utility, upsets copyright’s balance, and leads to the underuse of 
protected expression. 
A. Copyright’s Balance 
Unlike other philosophical rationales for intellectual property 
protection,35 the American model views protecting authors’ rights 
not as an end unto itself, but rather as a means—specifically, the 
 
32 For a discussion of ringtones, see infra notes 146–148 and accompanying text. As 
to whether end-users might attempt to circumvent the law by reassembling entire 
songs from ten second segments, see the discussion of strategic abuse in Section III.C. 
33 See Dan Hunter & F. Gregory Lastowka, Amateur-to-Amateur, 46 Wm. & Mary 
L. Rev. 951, 955–56 (2004) (discussing the ascent of user-based content). 
34 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Creative Economies, 1 Mich. St. L. Rev 33, 35 (2006) 
(characterizing culture and knowledge as remix). 
35 See, e.g., Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 Geo. L.J. 287 
(1988) (discussing the leading philosophical justifications for intellectual property pro-
tection). 
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means to produce a more robust intellectual and artistic culture.36 
On this view, copyright protection is necessary to remedy an un-
derproduction problem that arises from the “public good” nature 
of expressive works.37 Unlike tangible goods, public goods share 
two distinctive characteristics: nonrivalry of consumption and non-
excludability of benefits.38 A good is nonrivalrous in consumption if 
a unit of that good can be consumed by one person without dimin-
ishing the consumption opportunities available to others from that 
same unit.39 A good displays nonexcludable benefits if individuals 
who have not paid for the production of that good cannot be pre-
vented at a reasonable cost from availing themselves of its bene-
fits.40 The nonexcludability property of public goods gives rise to 
two related problems. First, public goods are likely to be under-
produced if left to the private market. Second, markets for public 
goods will not form. Since expressive works are essentially infor-
mation goods, they too are susceptible to the twin problems of un-
derproduction and lack of market exchange.41 Given that the cost 
of creating a new expressive work is generally high and the cost of 
copying that work is generally low, without copyright protection 
original creators would be reluctant to invest in the creation of new 
works. Unauthorized reproduction of successful expressive works 
and inventions would drive the market price down to the point 
where original authors would not be able to recover their initial 
expenditures. Although the original authors would still retain cer-
 
36 This is evident from the intellectual property clause in the Constitution that em-
powers Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing 
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
37 See, e.g., Richard P. Adelstein & Steven I. Perez, The Competition of Technolo-
gies in Markets for Ideas: Copyright and Fair Use in Evolutionary Perspective, 5 Int’l 
Rev. L. & Econ. 209, 218 (1985); Gordon, supra note 15, at 1610; Landes & Posner, 
supra note 30, at 326. 
38 See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 46–48 (1st ed. 
1988); Richard Cornes & Todd Sandler, The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, 
and Club Goods 6–7 (1986); Edwin Mansfield, Principles of Macroeconomics 400–04 
(6th ed. 1989). 
39 See Cornes & Sandler, supra note 38, at 6. 
40 See id. at 160; see also Patrick Croskery, Institutional Utilitarianism and Intellec-
tual Property, 68 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 631, 632 (1993). 
41 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellec-
tual Property Law 19–20 (2003). 
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tain advantages (such as lead time and claims to authenticity),42 in 
many cases those would be insufficient to allow creators to recoup 
their initial investment, let alone make a profit.43 As a result, there 
would be a suboptimal level of production of creative works.44 By 
creating and protecting exclusive rights in expressive works of au-
thorship, copyright law assures authors adequate return on their 
investment in the creation of new works. 
Securing adequate returns for authors, however, is not the pri-
mary purpose of copyright law. As is clear from the intellectual 
property clause of the Constitution, the Framers’ ultimate goal was 
“[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”45 The grant 
of limited exclusive rights to authors is the means selected for 
achieving this end,46 but the end itself is the wide dissemination of 
works after their creation47 and the promotion of learning.48 
 
42 See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright 
in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 281, 299–302 
(1970) (discussing the competitive advantages authors would retain even in the ab-
sence of copyright protection). 
43 See, e.g., Barry W. Tyerman, The Economic Rationale for Copyright Protection 
for Published Books: A Reply to Professor Breyer, 18 UCLA L. Rev. 1100, 1108–13 
(1971) (addressing the “difficulties with the economic argument for [the] abolition of 
copyright protection for published books”); see also Carla Hesse, Publishing and Cul-
tural Politics in Revolutionary Paris, 1789–1810 (1991) (detailing the harm caused to 
the publishing industry by the elimination of copyright protection in the wake of the 
French Revolution). 
44 See Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law 138–44 (2004) 
(discussing the social value of information and the optimal level of its production). 
45 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
46 See, e.g., Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promo-
tion of Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 Geo. 
L.J. 1771 (2006) (positing that the promotion of science and useful art is a limitation 
on Congress’s power to enact intellectual property laws); Lawrence B. Solum, Con-
gress’s Power to Promote the Progress of Science: Eldred v. Ashcroft, 36 Loy. L.A. L. 
Rev. 1, 19–20 (2002) (discussing the means-end structure of the intellectual property 
clause); Kevin A. Goldman, Comment, Limited Times: Rethinking the Bounds of 
Copyright Protection, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 705, 739 (2006). 
47 See Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (“By 
establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the 
economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”); see also Jane C. Ginsburg, 
Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection in Works of Information, 90 
Colum. L. Rev. 1865, 1873 (1990) (“[T]he 1710 English Statute of Anne, the 1787 
United States Constitution, and the 1790 United States federal copyright statute all 
characterized copyright as a device to promote the advancement of knowledge.”). 
48 See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1261–62 (11th Cir. 
2001) (noting that the copyright scheme is designed to promote learning). 
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Accordingly, copyright law must perform a balancing act. If protec-
tion is too weak, a suboptimal amount of intellectual work will be pro-
duced. If protection is too strong, the public will not receive the full 
intended benefit from works after their creation. In either case, future 
authors may be deprived of sources from which they can draw to 
build new works (either because the materials do not exist or because 
they are unable to make reasonable appropriations). Thus, when the 
cycle is out of balance, the public as a whole is the ultimate loser. 
In order to ensure adequate provision of expressive works, Con-
gress provided creators with the exclusive rights to reproduce, 
adapt, distribute, display, perform, and digitally perform49 their 
works, as well as any works that are “substantially similar.”50 To-
gether, these legally enforceable rights ensure that content produc-
ers can capitalize on the value of their creative output, thus provid-
ing a substantial incentive to create new works. 
At the same time, in order to protect the public interest in ac-
cessing and using works once they have been created and to ensure 
that excessively strong copyright protection does not thwart the 
very creativity it seeks to promote,51 the rights of authors are re-
stricted in three important ways: First, certain subjects, such as 
ideas, are outside the realm of protection entirely.52 Second, the du-
ration of protection is limited.53 And third, there is a fair use privi-
lege that permits, under certain circumstances, the unlicensed re-
production of protected expression.54 
 
49 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). 
50 Although the circuit courts have articulated several variations of the infringement 
inquiry, they are generally unified in holding that infringement hinges not on a finding 
of precise or exact copying, but rather on a finding that some manner of copying did 
occur, that the material actually copied was protected by copyright, and that the 
amount of copying was “substantial.” See Alan Latman, “Probative Similarity” as 
Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some Myths in Copyright Infringement, 90 
Colum. L. Rev. 1187, 1188–89 (1990). 
51 Cf. Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 11 (analyzing the manner in which the in-
ability of intellectual property owners to capture the full value of their works encour-
ages greater innovation and increases social welfare). 
52 See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 100–01 (1879) (establishing the 
idea/expression dichotomy); Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 
(discussing the Scènes à Faire doctrine). 
53 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 301–305. 
54 See 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
PARCHOMOVSKY_GOLDMAN_BOOK 9/10/2007 3:51 PM 
2007] Fair Use Harbors 1495 
B. Fair Use as a Balancing Tool  
Fair use is perhaps the most crucial policy tool for maintaining 
copyright’s intended balance. The doctrine legitimizes certain re-
productions of copyrighted expression that would otherwise consti-
tute copyright infringement. In Hohfeldian terms, the doctrine 
grants the public a privilege55 “to use the copyrighted material in a 
reasonable manner without [the owner’s] consent.”56 
This reasonableness inquiry has historically been, and still re-
mains, the essence of the fair use doctrine.57 When Congress codi-
fied the doctrine in 1976, it refrained from defining fair use or ar-
ticulating a clear test of fairness.58 Instead, it provided a 
nonexhaustive list of illustrative uses—such as comment, criticism, 
scholarship, research, news reporting, and teaching—that may 
qualify as fair. Then, in keeping with prior doctrine, it enumerated 
four nonexclusive factors to be considered by courts in deciding 
whether a particular use is fair. These four factors are 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use 
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;  
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;  
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation 
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and  
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of 
the copyrighted work.59 
 
55 See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Ap-
plied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale L.J. 16, 30 (1913) (distinguishing rights from 
privileges); see also David R. Johnstone, Debunking Fair Use Rights and Copyduty 
Under U.S. Copyright Law, 52 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 345, 368–70 (2005) (employ-
ing Hohfeld’s framework to analyze the fair use doctrine).  
56 Horace G. Ball, The Law of Copyright and Literary Property 260 (1944) (empha-
sis added). 
57 When Justice Story first laid the groundwork for the doctrine’s importation into 
American law in Folsom v. Marsh, he consciously followed the English model, es-
chewing any inquiry into the public interest and focusing solely on whether the defen-
dant’s use was, on its own terms, “fair.” 9 F. Cas. 342, 349 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 
4901). 
58 See Gideon Parchomovsky, Fair Use, Efficiency, and Corrective Justice, 3 Legal 
Theory 347, 352 (1997) (discussing the interpretive problems arising from the statu-
tory text). 
59 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
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Congress provided no guidance as to how to measure these fac-
tors against one another, whether all must be satisfied for a finding 
of fair use, or how conflicts among them are to be reconciled. In-
stead, Congress simply instructed the courts that “each case raising 
the question must be decided on its own facts.”60 As a result, the 
doctrine has become a catch-all exception to copyright protection.61 
To be sure, courts have attempted to define fair use and make 
sense of its objectives, but these efforts have failed unconditionally. 
The judicial path of fair use is paved with split courts, reversed de-
cisions, and inconsistent opinions.62 The hope that a common un-
derstanding would emerge over time did not materialize.63 This was 
not the intended state of affairs. As Justice Kennedy has noted, 
“The common-law method instated by the fair use provision of the 
copyright statute . . . presumes that rules will emerge from the 
course of decisions.”64 Yet just the opposite has occurred: the re-
peated application of the fair use doctrine has resulted in it grow-
ing increasingly unpredictable. 
Academics, for their part, have been unable to rescue fair use 
from its murkiness. Despite numerous attempts to distill a coherent 
conception, none of these formulations has been adopted by the 
courts, and scholars generally agree that it is now virtually impossi-
ble to predict the outcome of fair use cases.65 
Moreover, as Professor Polk Wagner has observed, this ambigu-
ity creates a negative feedback loop: faced with the increasingly 
 
60 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679. 
61 See Michael J. Madison, Rewriting Fair Use and the Future of Copyright Reform, 
23 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 391, 402 (2005) (“The substantive emptiness of fair use 
makes it something of a dumping ground for copyright analysis that courts can’t man-
age in other areas.”). 
62 See Parchomovsky, supra note 58, at 348 n.7 (demonstrating this point by review-
ing the case law). 
63 Leval, supra note 5, at 1105–06. 
64 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 596 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(citation omitted). 
65 See, e.g., R. Polk Wagner, The Perfect Storm: Intellectual Property and Public 
Values, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 423, 426–27 (2005) (“[E]ven at [a high] level of general-
ity, there is little more that can be usefully said about the division between fair and 
unfair uses in practice: The ‘know it when you see it’ nature of the analytic approach 
in this context simply precludes such observations.”); see also David Nimmer, “Fair-
est of Them All” and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, Law & Contemp. Probs., Win-
ter/Spring 2003, at 263, 278–84 (employing a statistical analysis to demonstrate the 
unpredictability of the fair use doctrine). 
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unpredictable nature of the doctrine, both copyright owners and 
content users perceive a loss of their rights and respond by making 
ever-broadening claims, with content owners claiming more in the 
way of exclusive rights, and content users claiming more in the way 
of fair use rights.66 This, of course, only feeds back into the cycle, 
increasing each side’s perception of loss and exacerbating the doc-
trine’s uncertainty.67 
C. Uncertainty and Its Cost 
To fully understand the harm caused by the overdeterrence of 
fair use, it is useful to view the doctrine within the larger legal con-
text. U.S. copyright law ostensibly establishes a standard of strict 
liability; the mental state of a putative infringer is irrelevant to the 
issue of direct liability.68 Courts have interpreted liability under the 
Copyright Act very broadly, ruling that it requires neither intent 
nor knowledge, thus making even unconscious copying action-
able.69 
A closer inspection, however, reveals that the “strict liability” 
view is inaccurate: it ignores the role that fair use plays in trans-
forming copyright law into a negligence-type regime. Just as a neg-
ligence standard imposes liability on individuals for deviating from 
socially optimal standards of behavior and absolves from liability 
injurers who invest in reasonable precautions,70 fair use protects us-
ers whose appropriations fall within a socially beneficial range. 
Consequently, fair use, like the negligence analysis in tort law, at-
tempts to guide behavior by punishing only those who deviate from 
the socially optimal standard. 
No clear understanding of the socially optimal standard has 
emerged, however, rendering fair use largely unknowable and un-
predictable. This comes at a high cost: law and economics scholars 
 
66 Wagner, supra note 65, at 427–28. 
67 Id. at 428–29. 
68 Mental state remains relevant to the issue of secondary liability. See Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005) (“One infringes 
contributorily by intentionally inducing or encouraging direct infringement, and in-
fringes vicariously by profiting from direct infringement while declining to exercise a 
right to stop or limit it.” (citations omitted)). 
69 See, e.g., Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, 420 F. Supp. 177, 180–81 
(S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
70 Shavell, supra note 44, at 180. 
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have long observed that vague standards cause overdeterrence. 
Under negligence-type standards, suboptimal investment in pre-
cautions leads to full liability whereas optimal investment results in 
no liability. But the vagueness of the fair use standard prevents ac-
tors from precisely discerning the optimal level of investment. As a 
result, actors find it in their best interest to err on the side of safety 
and either overcomply (by minimizing the use of protected works) 
or overinvest in precautions. 
In the copyright context, the problem of overdeterrence is ag-
gravated by several factors. First, due to their public good charac-
teristics, expressive works invariably generate spillovers (or posi-
tive externalities).71 Consequently, users of copyrighted material 
cannot capture the full benefit of the use but stand to bear the full 
cost if sued. Second, the Copyright Act provides a wide array of 
remedies to copyright owners, including injunctions and super-
compensatory damages. Courts can order the impounding of in-
fringing articles,72 allow plaintiffs the defendants’ profits,73 or award 
statutory damages of up to $150,000 per work infringed willfully.74 
This means that the expected cost faced by unauthorized users is 
likely to far exceed the expected, often quite modest, benefit. 
Given this disparity, users are unlikely to engage in fair use, and 
even in cases where authors are motivated by ideological reasons 
to take a chance on fair use, their publishers and distributors are 
likely to oppose the idea. For these gatekeepers, the relatively 
small reward simply does not justify incurring such substantial 
risk.75 
 
71 See, e.g., R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property 
and the Mythologies of Control, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 995 (2003) (explaining why copy-
righted information can never be fully appropriated and assessing the implications of 
this fact for policymaking). 
72 17 U.S.C. § 503 (2000). 
73 17 U.S.C. § 504(b). 
74 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). If the infringement is not willful, the maximum amount a 
plaintiff can collect is $30,000. § 504(c)(1). 
75 See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 26, at 583–84 (“It should be no surprise that pub-
lishers thus require permission for even brief quotations . . . .”). In addition to fear of 
costly litigation, there is a secondary element of self-interest, as these same publishers 
profit when follow-on artists choose to pay licensing fees to use their works. See Kate 
O’Neill, Against Dicta: A Legal Method for Rescuing Fair Use from the Right of 
First Publication, 89 Cal. L. Rev. 369, 401 (2001) (noting that “holders of substantial 
copyright interests have an incentive to narrow the scope of fair use, establish a cus-
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To protect against the uncertainty of fair use, the only alterna-
tive to not using the copyrighted content is to secure a license from 
the rightsholder. But the licensing option is fraught with problems 
of its own. In an important recent article, Professor James Gibson 
demonstrates how the vagueness of intellectual property doctrines, 
including fair use, forces users to secure licenses even when they do 
not necessarily need to do so and how this dynamic enables rights-
holders to expand their rights at the expense of users and the pub-
lic.76 
Additionally, securing an unnecessary license is a wasteful ex-
penditure of resources that could be directed to other, more crea-
tive, ends. The purpose of fair use, after all, is to spare users from 
these costs by giving them the privilege to use some protected ex-
pression for free. 
More importantly, perhaps, licensing fails to provide a solution 
for cases involving high transaction costs, strategic holdups, and 
unconscious or inadvertent copying. We discuss each of these cases 
in order. 
The connection between fair use and high transaction costs was 
established by Professor Wendy Gordon. She pointed out that in 
certain settings, the cost of negotiating a license exceeds the value 
of the use for the user.77 For example, if a user values a certain line 
from Gabriel Garcia Marquez’s One Hundred Years of Solitude at 
ten dollars and the cost of negotiating with HarperCollins Publish-
ers (the relevant rightsholder) is fifteen dollars, no deal will be 
consummated between the parties, even if HarperCollins’s asking 
price is lower than the user’s reserve price. More generally, when 
the cost of transacting exceeds a user’s reserve price, no voluntary 
transactions will occur. Such cases are natural contenders for a fair 
use finding. Allowing the user to reproduce the protected expres-
sion improves her utility without diminishing the utility of the 
rightsholder. 
Of course, transaction costs are not static. The rise of the Inter-
net and the advent of digital platforms, together with the develop-
 
tom of requiring permission for rights owned, earn revenue, and create a measure of 
market impact should they wish to challenge unlicensed uses of materials for which 
they hold the copyright”). 
76 Gibson, supra note 16. 
77 Gordon, supra note 15, at 1608. 
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ment of copyright clearance agencies,78 have reduced many of the 
transaction costs that previously stood as barriers to cost-effective 
bargaining.79 
Even so, transaction costs remain high in many settings, espe-
cially when a user needs to clear multiple copyrights in order to 
distribute a new work. Content users, such as documentary film-
makers who find themselves unable to secure licenses for any pro-
tected works that appear in their film, are then left with something 
of a Hobson’s choice: they must either obscure the copyrighted ma-
terial and thereby ‘falsify’ the ‘reality’ of the scene, or eliminate the 
scene in its entirety.80 Thus, the Eyes on the Prize series could not 
be broadcast or sold for over a decade,81 and Alex Gibney’s docu-
mentary Enron: The Smartest Guys in the Room82 was released 
without several historically valuable short clips in the final cut of 
the film.83 It should be emphasized, however, that even when only 
one protected work is involved, transaction costs may thwart bar-
gaining if the user places relatively little value on the use and the 
rightsholder cannot be readily ascertained or fails to take advan-
tage of digital negotiation platforms. 
Strategic bargaining by rightsholders may also get in the way of 
licensing. Rightsholders, in attempting to extract the lion’s share of 
the bargaining surplus, may overestimate the value of the license 
for users and demand excessive licensing fees. For example, many 
organizations that hold the copyrights to historically significant 
photographs and film footage traditionally licensed their use at lit-
tle or no cost. Today, however, they are more likely to view the 
 
78 See Randal C. Picker, From Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Con-
sent and Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 281, 295 
(2003) (“As transaction costs drop through a combination of institutional arrange-
ments such as the Copyright Clearance Center, and as the internet creates a ubiqui-
tous structure for micro-transactions—microconsents with micropayments—fair use 
might cease to play a meaningful role.”). 
79 See Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights Man-
agement on Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. Rev. 557, 564–67 (1998). 
80 See Nancy Ramsey, The Hidden Cost of Documentaries, N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 2005, at 
C13. See generally Patricia Aufderheide & Peter Jaszi, Untold Stories: Creative Conse-
quences of the Rights Clearance Culture for Documentary Filmmakers (2004), available 
at http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/files/pdf/UNTOLDSTORIES_Report.pdf. 
81 See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text. 
82 Enron: The Smartest Guys in the Room (Jigsaw Productions 2005). 
83 See Elaine Dutka, Copyright Isn’t the Last Word, L.A. Times, Nov. 18, 2005, at 16. 
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works as any other commodity and require much higher licensing 
fees.84 
The problem is not limited to historic material. Professors Adam 
Brandenburger and Barry Nalebuff approached the Rolling Stones 
for permission to open a chapter in their book on game theory with 
the line “What’s confusing you is the nature of my game.”85 The 
Stones, or more precisely their rights agent, showed no sympathy 
(devilish or otherwise) for the request and demanded $10,000 for 
the right to use the line. Even though the authors believed they had 
a strong claim for fair use, they opted to publish the book without 
the quotation.86 
Rightsholders may also refuse to license on ideological grounds. 
As Professor Rebecca Tushnet reports, “Numerous scholars have 
been denied permission to quote or reprint pictures on the basis of 
copyright owners’ disagreement with their interpretations, and fair 
use is no help to such scholars if publishers refuse to rely on the 
uncertain doctrine.”87 
Finally, licensing is not a viable solution for users who uncon-
sciously or inadvertently reproduce small amounts of copyrighted 
expression. As the case of Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs 
Music, Ltd. demonstrates, creators may subconsciously rely on 
copyrighted content in creating a new work without realizing it.88 
Furthermore, users may incorporate copyrighted expression into 
new works based on an erroneous understanding of the law.89 In 
addition, users may sometimes inadvertently reproduce protected 
expression, for example, by capturing a copyrighted poster in the 
background of a film. Since such users are not even aware that 
their activities are unlawful, they will not seek to license any rights. 
 
84 See Dixon, supra note 20, at R1. 
85 Email from Barry Nalebuff, Milton Steinbach Professor of Management, Yale 
School of Management, to Gideon Parchomovsky, Professor of Law, University of 
Pennsylvania Law School (Feb. 20, 2007, 14:57:20 EST) (on file with the Virginia Law 
Review Association). 
86 Id. 
87 Tushnet, supra note 26, at 585. 
88 420 F. Supp. 177, 180–81 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
89 See, e.g., Lipton v. The Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464 (2d Cir. 1995); U.S. Payphone v. 
Executives Unlimited of Durham, No. 89-1081, 1991 WL 64957, at *2 (4th Cir. Apr. 
29, 1991); see also R. Anthony Reese, Innocent Infringement in Copyright Law 7–17 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) (discuss-
ing the copying of works believed to be in the public domain). 
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Yet even minimal amounts of copying can lead to costly and drawn 
out litigation. 
II. SAFE HARBORS OF FAIR USE 
In this Part, we discuss a way to increase clarity and certainty for 
users of copyrighted works by enacting clearly defined, nonexclu-
sive fair use safe harbors. Uses that fall within these harbors would 
be considered per se fair. Uses that fall outside of them would con-
tinue to be analyzed under existing doctrine. Drawing on limited 
past experiences, we advance a specific proposal for enacting non-
exclusive fair use harbors and demonstrate how it may be defined 
and implemented. We then show how our proposal may salvage 
fair use with respect to digital rights, so as to further fair use inter-
ests. 
A. Introducing Rules into Copyright Law 
Legal norms are generally expressed as either standards or 
rules.90 A classic illustration of a standard is “drive safely,” whereas 
an oft-cited example of a rule is “drive 55 miles per hour or less.”91 
Standards are relatively easy to promulgate and provide judges 
with considerable discretion.92 Yet this discretion provides no ex 
ante certainty93 and allows for potentially inconsistent decisions, 
making future applications of the standard difficult to predict.94 
Rules, on the other hand, generally are more costly to promul-
gate, and their enforcement can often seem arbitrary and harsh.95 
They typically provide little or no flexibility to judges, and their 
application may lead to inequitable results in individual cases. 
However, the rigidity of rules provides substantial clarity and pre-
 
90 See generally Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examina-
tion of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life (1992); Louis Kaplow, Rules 
Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557 (1992); Pierre J. Schlag, 
Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 379 (1985); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with 
Rules, 83 Cal. L. Rev. 953 (1995). 
91 See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 90, at 560. 
92 See, e.g., id. at 564–65. 
93 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 90, at 976. 
94 See, e.g., id. 
95 See, e.g., id. at 995–96 (noting that “[r]ules [c]an [b]e [d]ehumanizing and 
[p]rocedurally [u]nfair”). 
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dictability, informing the public how to behave in order to comply 
with the legal norm.96 
Intellectual property law relies heavily on numerous vague stan-
dards, most notably fair use. The harm that flows from this ambigu-
ity has prompted some scholars to call for the introduction of rules 
in this area in order to increase certainty.97 Numerous other schol-
ars, though, have expressed skepticism at the idea of clarifying fair 
use with rules, arguing that a flexible, muddy standard is necessary 
to protect the public’s interest and maintain copyright’s balance.98 
Notwithstanding the academic opposition, there have been several 
attempts to enact safe harbors for copyright users. The next Sec-
tion examines the successes and failures of these efforts. 
B. Previous Attempts to Create Rules for Fair Use 
Given the uncertainty of the current fair use doctrine, it is not sur-
prising that there have been several attempts to establish a clearer 
understanding of the doctrine’s contours. Those attempts provide a 
 
96 See, e.g., id. at 976–77. 
97 See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 26, at 588 (“[T]he law might limit what counts as 
sufficient copying to constitute reproduction or creation of a derivative work, so that 
activities such as sampling and quoting would clearly be noninfringing.”). Tushnet, 
however, also suggests that “there is no way to know in advance how much copying is 
too much.” Id. We disagree with that assertion—at a low enough threshold, it is pos-
sible to make that determination ex ante. See also Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture 295 
(2004) (advocating for clearer and narrower lines demarcating the scope of protection 
for derivative works); Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. Rev. 87, 151–
52 (2004) (suggesting that the Copyright Office could be given the regulatory author-
ity to promulgate rules and safe harbors). 
98 See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 121, 140 
(1999) (“[F]air use appears to be employed in situations of high transaction costs, 
where a muddy entitlement may be appropriate. . . . The ‘muddy’ four-part balancing 
standard of fair use allows courts to reallocate what the market cannot.”); Michael W. 
Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. Rev. 1087, 1147 (2007) (arguing that rules for fair 
use would lack sufficient context-sensitivity); Madison, supra note 61, at 396 (“Since 
the complexity of the copyright statute already compares unfavorably to the tax code, 
it seems unwise to ‘solve’ fair use by adding more details to the statute.”); Matthew 
Sag, God in the Machine: A New Structural Analysis of Copyright’s Fair Use Doc-
trine, 11 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 381, 435 (2005) (arguing that a flexible fair 
use standard is needed to allow courts to adapt copyright protection to new innova-
tions); see also Jason Scott Johnston, Bargaining Under Rules Versus Standards, 11 
J.L. Econ. & Org. 256, 257 (1995) (“When the parties bargain over the entitlement 
when there is private information about value and harm, bargaining may be more ef-
ficient under a blurry balancing test than under a certain rule.”). 
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valuable reference point for our analysis and allow us to draw on the 
mistakes and successes of the past in designing our proposed system. 
1. Libraries—From a “Gentlemen’s Agreement” to Section 108 
The so-called “Gentlemen’s Agreement” of 193599 was the earli-
est attempt to create a fair use safe harbor. Enacted in response to 
the advent of microfilm and photo-duplication technology,100 the 
agreement was negotiated between the Joint Committee on Mate-
rials for Research (on behalf of libraries and their patrons) and the 
National Association of Book Publishers. It permitted libraries, 
museums, and similar institutions to reproduce, under a carefully 
specified set of circumstances, part of a copyright-protected work 
for scholarly purposes, so long as the copy was not produced for a 
profit and the recipient was notified that she was still bound by ap-
plicable copyright law regarding her use of the material.101 
Although this agreement did not have the force of law, it was 
nevertheless consistently honored by both libraries and publishers.102 
Moreover, when a publisher did attempt to challenge the practice, 
the Court of Claims, in a decision affirmed by an equally divided 
Supreme Court, held that the practice constituted fair use.103 
In the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress codified a version of the 
Gentlemen’s Agreement, providing several safe harbors for librar-
ies to facilitate fair uses of protected materials.104 The Act allows a 
library to make a single copy 
of no more than one article or other contribution to a copy-
righted collection or periodical issue, or [to make a single copy] 
of a small part of any other copyrighted work, if— 
 
99 The Gentlemen’s Agreement and the Problem of Copyright, 2 J. Documentary 
Reprod. 29, 31–33 (1939). 
100 See Peter Hirtle, Research, Libraries, and Fair Use: The Gentlemen’s Agreement 
of 1935, 53 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 545, 545–46 (2006). 
101 See The Gentlemen’s Agreement, supra note 99, at 31. 
102 Randall Coyne, Rights of Reproduction and the Provision of Library Services, 13 
U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 485, 488–89 (1991). 
103 Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1362 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff’d 
by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975). 
104 Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 108, 90 Stat. 2541, 2546–48 (codified as amended at 17 
U.S.C. § 108 (2000)). 
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(1) the copy or phonorecord becomes the property of the user, 
and the library or archives has had no notice that the copy or 
phonorecord would be used for any purpose other than private 
study, scholarship, or research; and 
(2) the library or archives displays prominently, at the place 
where orders are accepted, and includes on its order form, a 
warning of copyright in accordance with requirements that the 
Register of Copyrights shall prescribe by regulation.105 
Although the statute is not a model of predictability—for exam-
ple, it does not define what constitutes a “small part” of a pro-
tected work106—it has been effective at providing guidance for li-
braries and shielding them from liability.107 This safe harbor does 
not provide any protection for end-users, however, leaving them 
subject to the traditional four-factor analysis.108 
2. The “Classroom Guidelines” 
The most famous attempt to create a fair use safe harbor was the 
establishment of guidelines for copying by teachers for classroom 
use, commonly known as the “Classroom Guidelines.”109 These 
 
105 Id. § 108(d). 
106 See Hirtle, supra note 100, at 3–4 (noting that the amount of copying that would 
be permissible was consciously left out of the discussion). 
107 See, e.g., Office of Legal Counsel, Dep’t of Justice, Whether and Under What 
Circumstances Government Reproduction of Copyrighted Materials Is a Noninfring-
ing “Fair Use” Under Section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976, at 15 (Apr. 30, 1999), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/pincusfinal430.htm (“If a certain library practice 
is noninfringing under the specific and detailed provisions of section 108(a) (as con-
fined by section 108(g)(2)), a library need not be concerned about how that particular 
photocopying practice would fare under section 107’s more complex and indetermi-
nate fair use standards.”). 
108 See, e.g., Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 916 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(“We do not deal with the question of copying by an individual, for personal use in 
research or otherwise (not for resale), recognizing that under the fair use doctrine or 
the de minimis doctrine, such a practice by an individual might well not constitute an 
infringement.”). 
109 See Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-for-Profit Educa-
tional Institutions with Respect to Books and Periodicals, H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 
68–70 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5681–83; see also Kenneth D. 
Crews, The Law of Fair Use and the Illusion of Fair-Use Guidelines, 62 Ohio St. L.J. 
599, 615–19 (2001) (discussing the “Classroom Guidelines”). Similar frameworks were 
promulgated to address the copying of musical works and television broadcasts. See 
Guidelines for Off-Air Recordings of Broadcast Programming for Educational Pur-
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rules were the product of negotiations between representatives of 
educational institutions, authors, and publishers.110 While the terms 
of the agreement were not incorporated into the statute itself, they 
were included with the House Report accompanying the Act.111 
Most notable among the Guidelines is the portion that seeks to 
clarify the meaning of Section 107’s provision that “multiple copies 
for classroom use” could constitute fair use by providing that 
Multiple copies (not to exceed in any event more than one copy 
per pupil in a course) may be made by or for the teacher giving 
the course for classroom use or discussion; provided that: 
A. The copying meets the tests of brevity and spontaneity as de-
fined below; and, 
B. Meets the cumulative effect test as defined below; and, 
C. Each copy includes a notice of copyright[.]112 
The “brevity” requirement limits the number of words that may 
be copied from a literary work.113 “Spontaneity” requires that the 
decision to make a copy be sufficiently close in time to its educa-
tional use for “maximum teaching effectiveness” such that “it 
would be unreasonable to expect a timely reply to a request for 
permission.”114 Finally, the “cumulative effect test” limits the total 
number of excerpts a teacher may make from a single author or 
during a single class term.115 
Although these Guidelines appear to be an improvement over a 
traditional four-factor analysis, they fall short of constituting real 
bright-line safe harbors.116 The problem lies in the fact that the 
 
poses, H.R. Rep. No. 97-495, at 8–9 (1982); Guidelines for Educational Uses of Music, 
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 70–71; see also Crews, supra, at 619–21 (discussing the 
“Music Guidelines” and “Off-Air Videotaping Guidelines”). 
110 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 67. 
111 Id. at 67–70. 
112 Id. at 68.  
113 Id. at 68–69. 
114 Id. at 69. 
115 Id. 
116 See 4 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright 
§ 13.05[E][3][a] (4th ed. 2007); Crews, supra note 109, at 619 (“The guidelines may 
well offer more certainty, but they still raise their own questions and pose their own 
problems for application.”). 
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Guidelines incorporate by reference murky standards that offset 
any clarity provided by the rules. The brevity requirement, for ex-
ample, allows for the copying of “a complete article, story or essay 
of less than 2,500 words,” but a subsequent qualification excludes 
from that group a vaguely defined class of “special works.”117 
Similarly, the “spontaneity” rule does not provide a set amount 
of time in which to use the copied work, but rather includes such 
amorphous thresholds as the reasonability of expecting a timely 
reply and “the moment of [a work’s] use for maximum teaching ef-
fectiveness.”118 The Guidelines, moreover, provide only vague pro-
hibitions, such as “[c]opying shall not . . . substitute for the pur-
chase of books, publishers’ reprints or periodicals.”119 These 
embedded standards provide tremendous leeway for rightsholders 
to claim that many types of copying fail to conform to the Guide-
lines. 
Finally, the Guidelines do not have the force of law.120 Although 
the House Judiciary Committee endorsed the Guidelines as “a rea-
sonable interpretation of the minimum standards of fair use,”121 
they cannot be relied upon with the same confidence as if they 
were legally binding.122 
Notwithstanding these shortcomings,123 the Guidelines seem to 
be reasonably effective at providing traditional classroom teachers 
with some ability to make educational use of copyrighted materi-
 
117 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 68–69 (defining special works as “[c]ertain works in 
poetry, prose or in ‘poetic prose’ which often combine language with illustrations and 
which are intended sometimes for children and at other times for a more general au-
dience [and which] fall short of 2,500 words in their entirety”). 
118 Id. at 69. 
119 Id. 
120 See Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1178 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting that the Guide-
lines are “instructive on the issue of fair use” but “not controlling on the court”). 
121 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 72. 
122 See, e.g., Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 919 n.5 (2d Cir. 
1994) (noting that the Guidelines are not binding and exist only as persuasive author-
ity); Basic Books v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1536 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 
(citing Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 116, at § 13.05[E][3][a], for the proposition 
that “a use which is within the [Classroom] Guidelines may exceed fair use”). 
123 For further academic criticisms, see Ann Bartow, Educational Fair Use in Copy-
right: Reclaiming the Right to Photocopy Freely, 60 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 149, 159–63 
(1998) (discussing numerous flaws in the Classroom Guidelines); Carol M. Silberberg, 
Preserving Educational Fair Use in the Twenty-First Century, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 617, 
636–39 (2001) (same). 
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als. Their major failing seems to be that they offer the potential for 
greater utility at the expense of predictability. Although the Class-
room Guidelines set out to establish a minimum amount of use that 
would be considered fair, rather than a maximum,124 the negotiators 
aimed to set the threshold at something more akin to a middle 
ground compromise, rather than a true minimum.125 
3. The Family Movie Act 
With the Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005, 
Congress created a technologically sophisticated exception to 
copyright infringement, and one that also differs philosophically 
from the two safe harbors discussed above.126 In response to pa-
rental concern about objectionable content, several media com-
panies began offering to edit lawfully acquired copies of movies 
by removing content such as nudity and profanity.127 Shortly 
thereafter, different entrepreneurs developed systems that would 
program DVD players to automatically make similar changes 
while a film was being played, by skipping certain scenes128 or 
lowering the volume over particular pieces of dialogue. After the 
Directors Guild of America inadvertently posted a press release 
indicating their intention to sue over these practices,129 a consor-
tium of companies filed for a declaratory judgment that these ed-
 
124 See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 68 (“The purpose of the following guidelines is to 
state the minimum standards of educational fair use under Section 107 . . . .”). 
125 The two main criticisms levied against the Guidelines are that they are too re-
strictive and too unpredictable. See Bartow, supra note 123, at 162–63. In practice, of 
course, greater predictability would likely require greater restrictions, while less re-
strictive rules probably would be accompanied by less predictability. 
126 Pub. L. No. 109-9, 119 Stat. 218. 
127 See, e.g., Michael Janofsky, Utah Shop Offers Popular Videos with the Sex and 
Violence Excised, N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 2001, at A11. 
128 See, e.g., Rick Lyman, Hollywood Balks at High-Tech Sanitizers: Some Video 
Customers Want Tamer Films, and Entrepreneurs Rush to Comply, N.Y. Times, Sept. 
19, 2002, at E1. 
129 See Press Release, Directors Guild of America, DGA Files Lawsuit Against Entities 
that Provide Unauthorized Altered Versions of Videocassettes and/or DVDs (Aug. 20, 
2002), http://www.viewerfreedom.org/legal/20020820DGA/DGAfileslawsuit.PDF; see also 
Second Amended Complaint and Jury Demand at ¶¶ 16–17, Clean Flicks of Colo., L.L.C. 
v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (D. Colo. 2006) (No. 02-M-1662). 
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iting practices were protected by the first sale130 and fair use doc-
trines.131 
While the case was being litigated, Congress stepped in with the 
Family Movie Act of 2005 (“FMA”),132 which created an explicit 
exception to copyright infringement for the practices at issue.133 
The law essentially acts as a bright-line safe harbor and was suffi-
ciently clear to halt the extant litigation.134 Moreover, the FMA 
represents a significant evolutionary step up from the Classroom 
Guidelines and the Gentlemen’s Agreement because it allows con-
tent users to creatively alter protected works.135 
Although it is probably too soon to make a definitive evaluation 
of the FMA’s effectiveness as a safe harbor, the statute appears to 
have substantially improved both clarity and predictability in this 
one particular area, reinforcing the notion that sufficiently detailed 
and precise rules can be valuable additions to the current fair use 
framework. 
4. Summary 
Taken together, the above examples provide several reasons to 
be optimistic that new safe harbors, if properly crafted, would be 
both palatable and effective at improving the current copyright 
scheme. Although our proposal differs from these examples in sev-
eral important regards, incorporating the lessons of the past is cru-
cial to any plan going forward. The Gentlemen’s Agreement has 
 
130 The first sale doctrine distinguishes the rights to a copyrighted work from the 
rights to an embodiment of that work. Once someone lawfully acquires a book, for 
example, she may resell that copy without violating the copyright holder’s exclusive 
right to distribute the work. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000). 
131 See Second Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 129, at ¶ 15 
(“Plaintiffs disagree that their third party editing of commercial movies violates any 
trademark or copyright laws and believe that their actions set forth above are free 
speech and/or fair use and are protected by the First Amendment to the U.S. Consti-
tution.”). 
132 The FMA was passed as Title II of the Family Entertainment and Copyright Act 
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-9, § 167, 119 Stat. 218, 223–24. 
133 See id. § 202(a)(3), 119 Stat. at 222. 
134 Clean Flicks of Colo., 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1240, 1243. 
135 This also distinguishes the FMA from the statutory license that permits cover ver-
sions of songs. See 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2). While the license requires that “the ar-
rangement shall not change the basic melody or fundamental character of the work,” 
id., the FMA contains no such limitation; indeed, it is rooted in protecting a behavior 
designed to change a work’s fundamental character. 
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been largely successful because it balances the needs of both copy-
right owners and content users by allowing copying that is broad 
enough to be useful but still limited so as to protect the market for 
the original work. The Classroom Guidelines follow a similar 
model but have been less successful because, in trying to allow 
maximally useful copying, the broad scope necessitated the incor-
poration of corresponding checks against abuse, leading to de-
creased predictability. Finally, the FMA seems to strike an ideal 
balance, clearly delineating the scope of acceptable modification 
while ensuring that the commercial vitality of the original work is 
not diminished. 
Essentially, these earlier forays into fair use safe harbors suggest 
that the core principle—fairness—is not so inscrutable or elusive as 
to render bright-line rules impracticable. To the contrary, these 
case studies reveal that clearly defined and narrowly tailored safe 
harbors promote productive uses of protected materials that would 
otherwise be chilled, thereby pushing the copyright scheme closer 
to its optimal balance. 
C. Creating the Rules 
The lessons of the past give rise to several design principles. 
First, copyright owners and content users seem unlikely to ever 
reach a negotiated agreement on their own, even as to minimal 
safe harbors of fair use. Even though both groups would be made 
better off by the implementation of clarifying rules, unilateral ac-
tion by Congress (or a designated rulemaking body) will be neces-
sary to enact a system of fair use harbors. 
Second, for the safe harbors to be effective at facilitating fair 
use, they must be clear and predictable. This means employing 
bright-line rules that are free from any offsetting standards. 
Third, it is important to adopt a minimalist approach to the de-
sign of the safe harbors. That is, the safe harbors should protect 
appropriations of relatively small amounts of expression. 
Fourth, the safe harbors must apply to end-users, rather than just 
to intermediaries. Although content users often depend on librar-
ies and other third parties to make certain materials available, it is 
important that the safe harbors shield all parties seeking to make 
fair use of protected materials. 
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Consistent with the above observations, our proposed safe har-
bors seek to eliminate uncertainty wherever possible. Furthermore, 
they are intended to be nonexclusive additions to the current 
framework. Uses that fall outside of a harbor would not necessarily 
lead to liability; they would simply require a traditional four-factor 
analysis. 
As is the case with any legal rule, one may take issue with the 
specific limitations we suggest. Virtually all rules display a certain 
level of arbitrariness. Reasonable people may disagree about the 
specifics of speed limits, tax rates, and building codes. Yet those 
rules remain highly effective in guiding and promoting efficient be-
havior. Furthermore, the level of arbitrariness under our proposed 
scheme would in any event be lower than that of the current fair 
use regime. 
1. Literary Works 
Scholars and judges have identified the practice of copying a 
brief quotation as perhaps the clearest example of fair use in the 
case law. Nevertheless, a belief persists that even for a small snip-
pet of a literary work, a license is required.136 
We propose that for any literary work consisting of at least one 
hundred words, the lesser of fifteen percent or three hundred 
words may be copied without the permission of the copyright 
holder. The words need not appear consecutively (either in the 
original or in the copy), so long as the total number of duplicated 
words does not exceed the threshold.137 
 
136 Landes & Posner, supra note 41, at 216 n.16. 
137 For example, Dr. Seuss famously wrote Green Eggs and Ham using only fifty dif-
ferent words. See Louis Menand, Cat People: What Dr. Seuss Really Taught Us, New 
Yorker, Dec. 23 & 30, 2002, at 148, 152. While an end-user might be permitted to 
copy all fifty different words, and even to repeatedly use those words in varying com-
binations, an attempt to assemble those words into a recreation of the original work in 
excess of three hundred words would clearly exceed the safe harbor threshold. Cf. 
Jorge Luis Borges, Pierre Menard, Author of Don Quixote, in Ficciones 29, 32 (An-
thony Bonner & Emecé Editores trans., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1993) (1939) (describ-
ing a fictional author’s attempt to independently conceive and write a novel that mim-
ics, word for word, the text of Miguel de Cervantes’s Don Quixote).  
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One can quibble, of course, with where the threshold is drawn,138 
but the more important point here is simply to be precise and pre-
dictable. So long as a user stays within the prescribed limits, she is 
safe from claims of infringement and the need to face the uncer-
tainties of the current four-factor analysis. 
Previous safe harbors have avoided placing any minimum size 
restriction on the work being copied.139 We have rejected such a 
formulation to avoid the scale problem that plagued the Classroom 
Guidelines and required the inclusion of the vague and confusing 
“special works” exception.140 Instead, we simply exclude from the 
safe harbor appropriations from any works shorter than one hun-
dred words. This means that the safe harbor will be inapplicable to 
some forms of artistic expression, such as haiku141 and other short 
poems. While in the future it might be possible to create additional 
safe harbors specifically tailored to those types of works, we do not 
attempt to do so here, choosing instead to focus on a single excep-
tion for all literary works in order to emphasize both simplicity and 
predictability. 
2. Sound Recordings and Musical Compositions 
As for sound recordings, we propose that the lesser of ten per-
cent or ten seconds may be copied without permission. The por-
tions borrowed need not be consecutive, so long as the cumulative 
amount does not exceed the safe harbor. In order for this safe har-
bor to be clear and predictable, there should be no restrictions on 
the types of uses that end-users may make. Moreover, this harbor 
must extend to any musical composition underlying a ten-second 
 
138 We selected the lower bound—fifteen percent of a one-hundred-word work—to 
correspond roughly to two lines from a sonnet and the upper bound—three hundred 
words from a longer piece—to capture passages approximately the size of Hamlet’s 
“To be or not to be” soliloquy. See William Shakespeare, Hamlet, Prince of Denmark 
act 3, sc. 1. 
139 See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 67–70 (1976) (discussing the Agreement on 
Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-for-Profit Educational Institutions), as re-
printed in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680–83; Bruce A. Lehman, U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office, The Conference on Fair Use: Final Report to the Commissioner 
on the Conclusion of the Conference on Fair Use § 4.2.1, at 53 (1998). 
140 See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 69. 
141 For a discussion of the applicability of fair use to haiku, see Posting of David A. 
Giacalone to f/k/a, Haiku and the Fair Use Doctrine, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ 
ethicalesq/haiku-and-the-fair-use-doctrine/ (Jan. 16, 2004, 16:57 EST).  
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sound recording, with an important caveat: just as an end-user can 
take no more than ten seconds from a single recording, she can 
take no more than ten seconds embodying any particular musical 
composition.142 
At the same time, though, this safe harbor could allow for the 
recreation of more than ten seconds of a work that itself incorpo-
rates protected material. Take, for example, Eminem’s “Stan,”143 
which heavily samples Dido’s “Thank You.”144 An artist would be 
free to take ten seconds from “Thank You” as well as ten seconds 
from “Stan,” so long as the ten seconds taken from “Stan” did not 
also contain any portion of the “Thank You” sound recording. 
Placing the two portions back-to-back might theoretically replicate 
twenty seconds of “Stan,” yet the work would remain within the 
safe harbor. 
This aspect of the safe harbor has some interesting implications 
for collage. Take the case of a collage artist, who assembles a string 
of ten-second clips from ten different sound recordings. Could 
anyone copy that entire one-hundred-second work and fall within 
the safe harbor? The answer is no. The key is to realize that these 
ten-second clips should be treated like public domain materials: 
there is no copyright protection in them individually, but someone 
who assembles them nevertheless maintains copyright protection in 
their selection and arrangement.145 
This proposal would shift the established order far more than 
the literary works proposal. In the absence of a fair use exception, 
the music sampling market has grown more sophisticated,146 and 
 
142 For example, one might wish to contrast the studio recording of “Maggie’s Farm” 
that Bob Dylan released on Bringing It All Back Home (Columbia Records 1965), 
with the faster, more controversial version performed that year at the Newport Music 
Festival (and captured by Martin Scorsese in the documentary No Direction Home 
(Paramount Pictures 2005)). Under the safe harbor, one could copy five seconds from 
each, or any other combination of the two, so long as the finished work contained no 
more than ten total seconds worth of appropriation embodying the “Maggie’s Farm” 
musical composition. 
143 Eminem, Stan, on The Marshall Mathers LP (Interscope Records 2000). 
144 Dido, Thank You, on Sliding Doors: Music from the Motion Picture (MCA 1998). 
145 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103 (2000); see also Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 
499 U.S. 340, 350–51 (1991); Key Publ’ns v. Chinatown Today Publ’g Enters., 945 F.2d 
509, 514–16 (2d Cir. 1991). 
146 David W. Opderbeck, Peer-to-Peer Networks, Technological Evolution, and In-
tellectual Property Reverse Private Attorney General Litigation, 20 Berkeley Tech. 
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ringtones for cellular phones have become a substantial source of 
revenue for the record labels.147 Yet it does not appear that protect-
ing these short samples is necessary to foster the creation of new 
musical works. To the contrary, their dissemination appears to aid 
musical sales.148 
Nevertheless, we are cognizant of the fact that this aspect of our 
proposal is likely to meet substantial resistance, and so we note 
that it could be modified to protect ringtones by incorporating a 
second baseline, such that the safe harbor would not apply to new 
musical works that consist of more than ten percent copied mate-
rial. This would significantly limit the safe harbor’s utility for col-
lage artists and music samplers, but it would substantially reduce 
the viability of safe harbor works as market substitutes for ring-
tones. 
3. Audiovisual Works (I) 
For audiovisual works, we propose a safe harbor that would al-
low users to reproduce the lesser of ten percent or thirty seconds of 
any protected work.149 The nature of this medium necessitates cer-
tain restrictions. Without any limitations, one could take, say, an 
image of Mickey Mouse from a single frame of Fantasia,150 transfer 
it onto T-shirts or hats, and directly compete with Disney’s clothing 
line. For this reason, we propose limiting the safe harbor to appro-
priations into other audiovisual works. Thus, an artist could take 
 
L.J. 1685, 1743 (2005) (“The music sampling market is beginning to mature as licens-
ing terms become standardized and royalty-free sample content fills a market 
niche.”). 
147 In 2005, for example, sales of ringtones in the United States exceeded $600 mil-
lion. Jeff Leeds, The Loudest Ringtone: Hello? It’s 50 Cent Calling Collect, N.Y. 
Times, Dec. 25, 2005, at AR2. 
148 Paul R. La Monica, Ringtones: The Sound of Money, CNNMoney.com, Apr. 12, 
2006, http://money.cnn.com/2006/04/12/commentary/mediabiz/ (“[M]usic executives 
say that ringtones serve as a marketing tool that can help lift sales of singles and al-
bums.”). 
149 While some might argue with this amount on the grounds that copying thirty sec-
onds from a film could, for example, reveal a major plot twist, we do not find this con-
cern compelling, as critics already have the ability to act as “spoilers” under the cur-
rent framework. See, e.g., Michael Blowen, The Bickering Game, Boston Globe, Mar. 
23, 1993, at 54 (describing critic Gene Siskel’s on-air revelation of the plot twist to The 
Crying Game). 
150 See The Sorcerer’s Apprentice, in Fantasia (Walt Disney Pictures 1940). 
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thirty seconds from Fantasia and incorporate it into her own film, 
but not into a children’s book.  
Some might object to this safe harbor on the ground that it 
would negatively impact, for example, sports leagues that currently 
license highlights to news broadcasts and later package that same 
footage into “Best Moments” DVDs.151 While this safe harbor 
might allow for some competition in the derivative works market-
place, we do not believe that allowing thirty-second clips to be 
used, either alone or in montage format, would act as a market 
substitute for the sporting events themselves, nor do we suspect 
that they would substantially undermine the incentive to create 
new works.152 
Digital editing presents a related, yet different, challenge. In 
Forrest Gump, for example, director Robert Zemeckis altered pre-
existing footage of historical events to make it appear as though 
Tom Hanks were interacting with Elvis Presley, John F. Kennedy, 
and Richard Nixon.153 Similarly, filmmakers have taken thirty-
second clips from preexisting footage to make it appear as if Fred 
Astaire were using a Dirt Devil and John Wayne were drinking a 
Coors.154 Employing similar techniques, someone could theoreti-
cally cull thirty-second clips from the approximately one hundred 
films featuring Samuel L. Jackson155 and then digitally edit the ma-
terials to create a single, coherent narrative. Obviously, there are 
certain practical limitations to this technique, but it does not seem 
fanciful to suppose that someone could draw short film and sound 
clips from the 400 episodes of The Simpsons,156 combine them with 
 
151 See, e.g., The NFL’s Greatest Hits (NFL Films 1992). 
152 But see New Boston Television v. Entm’t Sports Programming Network, No. 81-
1010, 1981 WL 1374, at *2 (D. Mass. Aug. 3, 1981) (rejecting a fair use defense and 
issuing a preliminary injunction against the use of sports highlights during news 
broadcasts). 
153 Forrest Gump (Paramount Pictures 1994). 
154 See Leora Broydo, Attack of the Celebrity Vacuum-Cleaner-Salesman Ghouls, 
Salon, July 8, 1997, http://www.salon.com/july97/media/media970708.html. 
155 See The Internet Movie Database Filmography of Samuel L. Jackson, 
http://imdb.com/name/nm0000168/ (last visited May 15, 2007) (listing the actor’s film 
and television appearances). 
156 See, e.g., Benjamin Toff, ‘Simpsons’ Milestone Boosts Ratings, N.Y. Times, May 
22, 2007, at E2 (noting that 400 episodes of The Simpsons have been produced). 
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original drawings and/or sound dubbing that does not infringe 
copyright, and produce a market substitute for a new episode.157 
Our solution to this problem? Do nothing. Many of the concerns 
with such scenarios are already addressed by other aspects of copy-
right158 and by other areas of the law generally (most notably 
trademark, unfair competition, and right of publicity).159 But if no 
other laws are violated, copyright should not stand in the way of 
the creative manipulation and reuse of existing materials.160 
4. Audiovisual Works (II) 
We propose an additional audiovisual safe harbor that expands 
upon the first: anyone may include in an audiovisual work any ar-
chitectural, choreographic, or pictorial work, so long as that work is 
not displayed for more than thirty seconds and provided those 
thirty seconds comprise no more than ten percent of the new 
work.161 We do not draw any distinction between a “featured” dis-
 
157 The National Lampoon used a similar process to create “The Lost Episode” of 
Seinfeld. The Lampoon crafted a new narrative arc by weaving together scenes from 
the Seinfeld television program with the infamous video of Michael Richards’ racist 
tirade during a stand-up comedy performance. See Greg Connors, Keeper of the 
Comedy Flame, Buffalo News, Feb. 4, 2007, at M11. 
158 For example, copyright law already extends independent protection to fictional 
characters. See, e.g., Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 660–62 (7th Cir. 2004) (not-
ing that fictional characters are independently copyrightable); Walt Disney Prods. v. 
Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 753–55 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that Disney characters such 
as Mickey and Minnie Mouse are copyrightable as distinct entities); Detective Comics 
v. Bruns Publ’ns, 111 F.2d 432, 432–34 (2d Cir. 1940) (holding that the character of 
Superman was infringed by the similar “attributes and antics” of the Wonderman 
character). Although the Ninth Circuit once notoriously held that Dashiell Hammett’s 
detective Sam Spade was not copyrightable as a distinct character, Warner Bros. Pic-
tures v. CBS, 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954), that decision has been roundly criticized 
and effectively overturned. See Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 660 (“The Ninth Circuit has 
killed the [Sam Spade] decision, see Olson v. National Broadcasting Co., 855 F.2d 
1446, 1452 and n.7 (9th Cir. 1988); Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, supra, 581 
F.2d at 755 and n.11, though without the usual obsequies . . . .”). 
159 See generally Bela G. Lugosi, California Expands the Statutory Right of Publicity 
For Deceased Celebrities While Its Courts Are Examining the First Amendment 
Limitations of that Statute, 10 DePaul-LCA J. Art & Ent. L. 259, 261, 275, 278 (2000). 
160 Furthermore, some content owners have concluded that permitting such uses is 
beneficial to their own interests. See, e.g., Slicing, Mashing Shows OK with CBS, Chi. 
Sun-Times, Jan. 10, 2007, at 61. 
161 The ten percent maximum is employed to prevent certain scenarios from falling 
within the safe harbor, such as the conversion of a single photograph into a thirty-
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play and a “background and montage” display162—to ensure clarity 
and predictability, any use would be permitted. 
This proposal is likely to be significantly more controversial than 
the preceding proposals. It would allow, after all, for one hundred 
percent of these works to be copied. Yet, in the case of visual 
works, it is often difficult to make many productive uses of less 
than the entire work.163 Thus, we have proposed a safe harbor de-
signed to facilitate effective use of these works, although we sug-
gest several limitations to prevent potential abuses. 
Take the following hypothetical: A photographer arranges three 
Peanuts comic strips so that they fill the panel on a single frame of 
film, then places three more strips on a second frame, and so on, 
until she places the last of 2,160 strips on the 720th frame. Played at 
the standard rate of twenty-four frames per second,164 the entire 
film would last thirty seconds. Yet one could also pause the film 
and watch it frame by frame, making it effectively a Peanuts e-
book containing nearly six years’ worth of strips. 
While this may strike some readers as problematic, it is difficult 
to distinguish this scenario from the case of an end-user copying 
thirty seconds from an animated film. In that case, the end-user 
copies 720 (or more) frames from an existing work, even though 
each frame contains a distinct (and independently copyrightable) 
drawing. 
Our solution is to create a separate cap for visual works, includ-
ing serialized or sequential art. To fall within the safe harbor, an 
 
second short film set to repeat over and over again, making it virtually indistinguish-
able from a digital image. 
162 Cf. 37 C.F.R. § 253.8 (2006) (setting the royalty rates for the use of pictorial 
works by public broadcasting entities, with varying rates depending on whether the 
use of a work is designated a “featured” display or a “background or montage” dis-
play). 
163 See Tushnet, supra note 26, at 588 (“Requiring complete or near-complete copy-
ing to find infringement would be most helpful with literary works and least helpful 
with visual works, which often need to be shown in full for ‘quotation’ to be effec-
tive.”); see also Crews, supra note 109, at 634 (noting that “[t]he use of visual im-
ages . . . will most likely require the entire work, a fact that most often weighs against 
fair use”). 
164 It is worth noting that digital compression allows for the creation of works that 
contain many more than twenty-four frames per second. See, e.g., Candus Thomson, 
Speed and Danger Rise; Falls, Injuries Are Accumulating at the Winter Games, Balt. 
Sun, Feb. 15, 2006, at 1A (noting that NBC’s Olympic coverage used a camera that 
captured two thousand frames per second). 
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end-user may not copy more than three visual works of art that are 
part of a single sequence or series, or feature the same copyrighted 
character. The key to making this limitation work is finding a use-
ful way to distinguish copying 720 frames of Peanuts comic strips, 
which are intended to be viewed separately and which should not 
fall within the safe harbor, from copying 720 frames worth of 
Mickey Mouse images, which are intended to be viewed as a single 
cartoon and to which the safe harbor should apply. Here, the 
Copyright Act comes to our aid. The Act defines the visual portion 
of “audiovisual works” as “consist[ing] of a series of related images 
which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of ma-
chines, or devices such as projectors, viewers, or electronic equip-
ment.”165 Applying this definition to the work being copied would 
allow the safe harbor to capture films, including animation, while 
excluding comic strips, graphic novels, or a series of paintings or 
photographs. 
A separate but related concern is that this safe harbor would un-
fairly burden certain media and certain types of works. For exam-
ple, while a newspaper would need to license a photograph to use 
alongside a story, a television broadcast could run the same image 
for free (for up to thirty seconds). An Internet news site, mean-
while, might string together a slide show containing the ten best 
photographs on the subject. One way to address this issue would be 
to resuscitate the “fresh news” rationale of International News Ser-
vice v. Associated Press166 and require a one-year postpublication 
moratorium before pictorial works are eligible for this particular 
safe harbor. While this is far from a perfect solution, we believe 
that it would not unduly undermine the incentive effect of copy-
right law; that is, the ability to make fleeting use of images after 
one year should not substantially erode the incentive to create new 
works. 
D. Implications 
Implementation of our proposed safe harbors—modest though 
they may seem to some—is likely to have far-reaching implications 
for the real world. Such implementation would secure the practice 
 
165 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
166 248 U.S. 215, 235, 245–46 (1918). 
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of incorporating brief quotes from preexisting literary works into 
new ones, allowing Professors Brandenburger and Nalebuff to 
quote a line from “Sympathy for the Devil” without fear of legal 
reprisal. Likewise, it would legitimize the art of sampling167 and 
provide greater freedom to a wide variety of creators, from the au-
thors of trivia games168 to collage artists and documentary filmmak-
ers.169 As we have seen, these artists often seek to appropriate only 
small amounts of expression that nevertheless constitute a signifi-
cant contribution to their new works. Without a robust and pre-
dictable fair use doctrine, however, they are left with little choice 
but to secure permission for their use of the material, often from 
multiple copyright owners, and their efforts are easily thwarted by 
high transaction costs or strategic holdups. Safe harbors invert the 
system, guaranteeing protection for the most fundamental acts of 
appropriation. 
The proposed scheme would also shelter users who inadver-
tently or unconsciously reproduce small amounts of protected ex-
pression. A brief display of a protected quilt, poster, or a photo-
graph in a film or a television series170 would not give rise to liability 
so long as it fell within a safe harbor. This change would be espe-
cially significant for the new generation of YouTube authors, who 
are generally unaware of the minutiae of copyright law. We are not 
suggesting that widespread ignorance of the law justifies changing 
it but rather that the law should recognize and facilitate these 
flourishing new forms of expression that make modest uses of pre-
existing material. 
Furthermore, our proposal would also reduce the problem of 
ideological refusals and copyright misuse. Content owners often 
 
167 But cf. Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390, 398 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(“Get a license or do not sample.”). 
168 See, e.g., Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol Publ’g Group, 150 F.3d 132, 135, 146 (2d 
Cir. 1998) (concluding that a Seinfeld trivia book was not protected by fair use). While 
the safe harbor would apply to trivia questions that directly quote particular lines of 
dialogue, it would have little application to instances where the material copied is not 
words but broader concepts. 
169 See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text (discussing the struggle to secure 
the rights necessary to broadcast the documentary Eyes on the Prize). 
170 See, e.g., Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, 126 F.3d 70, 71–73, 81 (2d Cir. 
1997) (finding that the use of a pictorial work that appeared on screen for less than 
thirty seconds was not so clearly fair use as to sustain defendant’s motion for sum-
mary judgment). 
PARCHOMOVSKY_GOLDMAN_BOOK 9/10/2007 3:51 PM 
1520 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 93:1483 
use restrictive licenses and the threat of litigation to censor certain 
types of commentary171 or critical reviews.172 With safe harbor pro-
tection, so long as the amount taken falls within the prescribed lim-
its, users would be free to reproduce expression for any purpose. 
Looking forward, the adoption of fair use harbors may enable a 
more limited version of Google Book Search.173 Although the full-
scale copying of entire books would remain beyond the bounds of 
our safe harbors, our proposal would guarantee Google the right to 
display, in response to users’ search requests, segments not exceed-
ing three hundred words from any literary work posted on the 
Internet now or in the future. 
But what would be the effect of our proposal on the production 
of new works? The short answer is that the implementation of safe 
harbors is unlikely to significantly chill the incentive to create new 
books, songs, and films. The safe harbors we propose should have a 
rather minimal effect on the revenues of most copyright owners. 
Many of the uses we seek to protect are of relatively small value, 
such that, given positive transaction costs, users would generally 
choose to forgo them rather than negotiate a license. Second, even 
if content owners could collect payment for some of the uses that 
fall within the safe harbors, it may not be socially desirable to let 
them do so.174 
Formalization of our scheme would have a small negative effect 
on the income of most current copyright owners, but at the same 
time it would decrease the cost of creating new works by allowing 
creators to reproduce limited amounts of protected expression for 
free. If Professor Larry Lessig is correct that contemporary culture 
 
171 See, e.g., Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1282 & n.6 (11th 
Cir. 2001) (Marcus, J., concurring) (noting that the Margaret Mitchell estate refuses 
to license Gone With The Wind to derivative works that deal with miscegenation or 
homosexuality). DC Comics is notoriously zealous in suppressing any suggestion of 
Batman and Robin as lovers. See, e.g., Jeet Heer, Pow! Wham! Permission Denied!, 
Lingua Franca, Mar. 2001, at 21, 21–22; Gallery Told to Drop ‘Gay’ Batman, BBC 
News, Aug. 19, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/arts/4167032.stm.  
172 See, e.g., Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, 292 F.3d 512, 520 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that the 
manufacturer of Beanie Babies attempts to stifle criticism by requiring, in exchange 
for a license to publish Beanie Baby photographs in a collector’s guide, the right to 
veto any text in the book). 
173 See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text (discussing Google Book Search). 
174 See supra notes 146–148 and accompanying text (discussing music sampling and 
ringtones). 
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develops incrementally and incorporation of preexisting material is 
emerging as the new mode of production,175 then the establishment 
of safe harbors would actually increase production and enrich the 
pool of creative expression. 
E. Salvaging Fair Use in the Digital Age 
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”)176 effects an 
important shift in the traditional balance of copyright law by pro-
hibiting users from circumventing Technological Protection Meas-
ures (“TPMs”)177 employed by copyright holders to protect content. 
The use of TPMs is ubiquitous: DVDs, CDs, and downloadable 
files are regularly encrypted to prevent their duplication.178 The an-
ticircumvention provisions of the DMCA do not contain a fair use 
exception; Congress consciously decided not to allow circumven-
tion even for the purpose of making a fair use of protected mate-
rial.179 
We suggest one final application of these fair use safe harbors: a 
requirement, imposed by Congress, that TPMs allow a single, por-
tion-limited fair use of any protected work. This is perhaps the 
most radical of our suggestions, insofar as it seeks to create a pre-
viously nonexistent partial “right” to fair use in the digital context. 
Under the current copyright framework, fair use is properly 
characterized as a Hohfeldian “privilege” rather than as a 
“right.”180 That is, the public is free to make fair uses of protected 
 
175 Lessig, supra note 34, at 37–38; see also Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, 
Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 Yale L.J. 369, 374 (2002) (discussing the value 
of large-scale collaborations in information production). 
176 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified in part at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201–
1205 (2000)). 
177 This is also referred to as Digital Rights Management (“DRM”). See, e.g., Edited 
& Excerpted Transcript of the Symposium on the Law & Technology of Digital 
Rights Management, 18 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 697, 760 (2003). But see Brad Stone & 
Jeff Leeds, Amazon to Sell Music Without Copy Protection, N.Y. Times, May 17, 
2007, at C1 (discussing the growing trend of distributing digital music files without en-
cryption). 
178 In some cases, the content distributors go to extreme lengths to ensure the mate-
rial cannot be copied. See, e.g., Joe Morgenstern, The Screens Have Eyes, Wall St. J., 
Dec. 10–11, 2005, at P3. 
179 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c); see also H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 86 (1998) (dis-
cussing the rejection of “an equivalent fair use defense”). 
180 See Hohfeld, supra note 55, at 30. 
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works, but rightsholders owe no affirmative “duty” to make their 
works available for such uses.181 So, for example, a playwright can-
not stop a critic from writing a scathing review of her play,182 but 
she is under no obligation to provide the critic with tickets to a per-
formance. Indeed, that playwright could choose to bar a critic’s ac-
cess to the work by any number of legal means,183 and fair use 
would provide the critic with no recourse. 
This dichotomy is perhaps seen most clearly in the context of the 
DMCA. The DMCA sought to facilitate the use of TPMs as effec-
tive tools to prevent copyright infringement by creating civil and 
criminal penalties for their circumvention.184 The statute, by its own 
terms, does nothing to alter the fair use framework;185 nevertheless, 
its effect is to virtually negate fair use with respect to many works 
offered in digital media.186 This is, of course, consistent with the 
Hohfeldian framework. Content users are still free to make fair use 
of protected materials, if they can independently obtain access to 
them. But they have no right to circumvent protection measures, 
just as theatre critics have no right to sneak into a playhouse by 
breaking open the back door. 
Commentators have harshly criticized the anticircumvention 
provisions of the DMCA, citing concern over the potential chilling 
effect of the legislation on free speech and especially on the ability 
of content owners to eliminate certain forms of fair use.187 These 
concerns are well founded. 
 
181 See Johnstone, supra note 55, at 368–70 (analyzing fair use in Hohfeldian terms). 
182 This is assuming, of course, that the critic’s review otherwise meets the require-
ments of fair use. 
183 For example, the playwright could prohibit the use of photography to capture the 
performance, even if the film would be used solely for fair use purposes. 
184 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201; see also Sharon R. King, Consumers Still Seem Resistant to 
Some New High-End Electronics, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1999, at C1 (noting that several 
motion picture studios held off on releasing their most popular titles in DVD format, 
for fear that the copy protection would be circumvented). 
185 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1) (“Nothing in this section shall affect rights, remedies, 
limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use, under this ti-
tle.”). 
186 See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amend-
ment Skein, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 80–81 (2001). 
187 See, e.g., Electronic Frontier Foundation, Unintended Consequences: Seven Years 
Under the DMCA 1 (2006), http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/DMCA_unintended_v4.pdf.  
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The problem is that until now there seemed to be no viable al-
ternative. The opposite solution—permitting circumvention for fair 
use purposes—would in all likelihood throw copyright’s balance off 
in the other direction. Creating a statutory exception that gives 
content users the ability to circumvent TPMs for any fair use pur-
pose may open the floodgates for mass infringements. The reason 
for this is straightforward: ex ante, there is no effective way to dis-
tinguish the true fair users from the spurious ones. Likewise, there 
is no ex ante test capable of evaluating the intended use that would 
allow fair uses to occur while still preventing those that are im-
proper. Thus, any system that enabled circumvention for possible 
fair uses would inevitably permit substantial unfair uses as well. 
Our proposed safe harbors present an opportunity to revive fair 
use with respect to content stored in digital media and thereby re-
instate the balance between content owners and users. Under our 
proposed system, there would be no difficulty establishing a system 
that permitted end-users to make certain fair uses of protected 
works. Therefore, Congress could mandate that content providers 
employ TPMs that enable end-users to access the minimal amounts 
of protected material that the safe harbors would otherwise allow. 
To prevent repeated application of the safe harbor as a means of 
engaging in potentially unfair uses—for example, copying an entire 
film in thirty-second increments—the TPMs should be designed to 
permit a single safe harbor-sized appropriation of any particular 
copy of a work. Thus, someone who purchases a new Blade Runner 
DVD188 would be able to copy any thirty-second segment, but after 
that initial appropriation, the TPMs could bar any additional copy-
ing over the lifetime of the disc. 
It is important to note that this proposal would not alter the cur-
rent DMCA framework; all it requires from Congress is the reclas-
sification of fair use as a Hohfeldian right and the imposition of a 
corresponding duty on content distributors to create a limited right 
of access. Such a move is not entirely without precedent. Congress 
has promulgated similar TPM carve-outs in other contexts. For ex-
ample, the DMCA prevents copyright owners and/or content dis-
tributors from encrypting television broadcasts in a manner that 
 
188 Blade Runner (Warner Bros. 1982). 
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would prevent the public from recording them for later viewing,189 
essentially creating a Hohfeldian right to engage in the “time-
shifting” that the Supreme Court had previously found to be fair 
use.190 
As with all of our proposals, this limited right of access is no 
magic bullet—it will not permit all fair uses of protected works. 
But it nevertheless represents a substantial improvement over the 
current system, which does not allow any fair uses (without prior 
approval). 
III. ADDRESSING POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS 
Although we have attempted to design the safe harbors nar-
rowly, so as to minimize the risk of abuse and other ill effects, we 
are mindful of the fact that several objections and criticisms might 
be raised against our proposal. In this Part, we address several of 
those concerns. 
A. Safe Harbors May Become a Ceiling, Rather than a Floor 
The strongest objection to the adoption of safe harbors in the 
past has been the fear that the safe harbors would become a ceil-
ing, rather than a floor. This concern has led James Gibson to 
summarily reject the idea of safe harbors. In his words, “courts 
convert safe harbors into the only harbors, floors into ceilings, and 
minimums into maximums.”191 
It is tempting to dismiss this objection as theoretically meritless; 
after all, copyright holders, users, and judges are all perfectly capa-
ble of understanding the plain meaning of the language. But as 
 
189 17 U.S.C. § 1201(k)(2). 
190 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 444, 456 (1984) (hold-
ing that private, noncommercial time-shifting of television broadcasts is fair use). The 
DMCA also requires content distributors to provide authorized transmitting organi-
zations (such as radio and television stations) the means to make ephemeral and ar-
chival copies of the encrypted works that they broadcast, and permits those organiza-
tions to circumvent the encryption if the content distributors fail to provide them with 
the means to do so “in a timely manner.” See 17 U.S.C. § 112(a)(2). Another example 
is the Audio Home Recording Act, which requires digital audio recording devices to 
contain a “Serial Copy Management System” that allows end-users to make first gen-
eration copies of digital audio recordings, but encodes those copies with a tag to pre-
vent anyone from making copies of those copies. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1002. 
191 Gibson, supra note 16, at 398 (footnote omitted). 
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Yogi Berra famously observed, “[i]n theory there’s no difference 
between theory and practice. But in practice, there is.”192 Take the 
case of the Classroom Guidelines, for example.193 Although they 
purport to set a minimum, for many educators they have become a 
de facto maximum, because their institutions will not permit any 
uses that exceed them.194 
There are several important differences between the Classroom 
Guidelines and our proposed safe harbors. The Guidelines came to 
be viewed as maximums because they were set at a substantially 
higher threshold. They were negotiated, in effect, not to reflect a 
minimum level of utility, but rather as a sort of middle ground 
compromise. Given this status, it was easier for parties on all sides 
to fall into the trap of letting the floor become the ceiling. 
Moreover, the Classroom Guidelines lacked the force of law and 
thus were not binding on courts. Without the force of law, the 
Guidelines became a convenient benchmark for litigation. For ex-
ample, New York University, in order to settle a lawsuit filed by 
the Association of American Publishers, agreed to be bound by the 
Classroom Guidelines, not as a minimum but as a maximum.195 This 
type of outcome has led some scholars to conclude that any bright-
line fair use rules would pose a danger of becoming ceilings rather 
than floors,196 but this sort of analysis misses the point. The extant 
 
192 This quotation may be apocryphal. Although generally attributed to Yogi Berra, 
it is also sometimes credited to computer scientist Jan L.A. van de Snepscheut. See 
Said What? Quotations: Theory Quotes, http://www.saidwhat.co.uk/bio/theory (last 
visited May 16, 2007). 
193 See supra notes 109–125 and accompanying text (discussing the Classroom 
Guidelines). 
194 Eugene R. Quinn, Jr. & Michelle Beveridge, Legal Issues in Building Course 
Web Sites: Copyright Law for Academics, 26 Hamline L. Rev. 83, 117 (2002). 
195 See Addison-Wesley Publ’g Co. v. N.Y. Univ., No. 82 CIV 8333 (ADS), 1983 WL 
1134, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 1983); see also Crews, supra note 109, at 641 (“For all 
practical purposes, the minimum standards of the original guidelines became maxi-
mum standards at NYU.”); Robert A. Gorman, Copyright Conflicts on the University 
Campus: The First Annual Christopher A. Meyer Memorial Lecture, 47 J. Copyright 
Soc’y U.S.A. 291, 313 n.36 (2000) (noting that the settlement agreement in Addison-
Wesley produced a “‘chilling’ effect on faculty members inclined to invoke broader 
fair use permissions”). 
196 See, e.g., Crews, supra note 109, at 697 (arguing that fair use guidelines should be 
flexible rather than rigid); Hillary Greene, Guideline Institutionalization: The Role of 
Merger Guidelines in Antitrust Discourse, 48 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 771 (2006) (argu-
ing that nonbinding guidelines are often treated in a precedent-like manner); Gregory 
K. Klingsporn, The Conference on Fair Use (CONFU) and the Future of Fair Use 
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safe harbors, despite claiming to be minimums, became maximums 
precisely because they did not carry the force of law. 
Further, it is not clear how courts could alter current fair use 
doctrine in a direction less favorable to would-be copiers. A review 
of the case law reveals only a handful of bright spots for users. At 
this time, the only uses that seem to enjoy relative immunity from 
liability are parodies197 and home videorecording for purposes of 
time shifting.198 It is hard to imagine that courts would change their 
positions on these uses were our proposal to be adopted. 
More importantly, even if the critics are absolutely correct, we 
still believe that on the whole our proposal will improve upon the 
current state of affairs. We concede that our safe harbors will exert 
something akin to a gravitational force on end-users. To picture 
this, imagine Artist A as she contemplates the inclusion of a short 
film clip in her new multimedia work. Under the current system, 
she might decide to incorporate thirty-five seconds and hope that 
the use would be found fair. Under our proposed system, she 
would have a strong incentive to limit that clip to thirty seconds. 
We submit, however, that for every Artist A who decides to limit 
her copying to within the safe harbor limits, there will be Artists B 
through Z who would make fair uses that they would have other-
wise foregone for fear of litigation. To understand this more 
clearly, the key is to see that in the current framework, the gravita-
tional pull is toward no use or licensing. Safe harbors would essen-
tially shift the center of gravity, pulling down some Artist A-types, 
while pulling up far more Artist B- through Z-types. Thus, the sum 
total of fair uses would be far greater within a safe harbor system.199 
Our proposed safe harbors also run the risk of a different pitfall: 
becoming a victim of their own success. Courts have sometimes 
 
Guidelines, 23 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 101, 122 (1999) (arguing that “fair use guide-
lines should be primarily a statement of principles” and that the current system “en-
courages [the use of clearly defined examples of fair use] as a maximum rather than a 
minimum standard”). 
197 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 572 (1994). 
198 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 421 (1984). 
199 Cf. Gibson, supra note 16, at 887–906 (discussing the problem of “doctrinal feed-
back” in copyright law, which encourages some copyright users to apply for licenses 
even when their intended use of copyrighted material would be a fair use and dis-
courages others from attempting to use the copyrighted material at all); Wagner, su-
pra note 65, at 426–29 (noting the increasing uncertainty among copyright users re-
garding whether their intended use will be protected by the fair use doctrine). 
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looked at the traditions and customs of the copying community to 
help determine whether a particular use is fair.200 Although not part 
of the literal wording of the statute, this sort of analysis draws on 
the view, most closely associated with David Hume, that the law 
should mirror popular practices and understandings.201 It follows, 
then, that if the safe harbors exhibit a sufficient gravitational pull, 
courts might later conclude that staying within the harbors repre-
sents the community norm and that exceeding them violates the 
customary practice, thus weighing against a finding of fair use.202 
It is precisely this fear that has motivated, in part, the recent 
movement to encourage documentary filmmakers to make more 
fair uses in order to establish certain practices more clearly as a 
tradition within the community.203 In the context of our proposed 
safe harbors, however, we think that this fear is exaggerated: it 
simply does not follow that the addition of safe harbors would lead 
to the demise of more robust fair uses. Analysis that relies on in-
dustry practices is unlikely to be so myopic as to disregard the exis-
tence of a range of uses, and, as now, litigants would be able to in-
 
200 See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 593 (1985) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Nation’s stated purpose of scooping the competition 
should under those circumstances have no negative bearing on the claim of fair use. 
Indeed the Court’s reliance on this factor would seem to amount to little more than 
distaste for the standard journalistic practice of seeking to be the first to publish 
news.”); Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 581 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that “framing 
and other traditional means of mounting and displaying art do not infringe authors’ 
exclusive right to make derivative works”); Triangle Publ’ns v. Knight-Ridder News-
papers, 626 F.2d 1171, 1176 (5th Cir. 1980) (giving weight to the fact that the alleged 
infringement took the form of “a comparative advertisement done in a manner which 
is generally accepted in the advertising industry”). 
201 See William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1659, 1692 (1988) (noting the “tradition emphasizing the limited power of the 
positive law and the degree to which it must and should track customs and popular 
understandings—a tradition whose most insightful exponent was David Hume”); see 
also H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 44–48 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing the role of cus-
tom in shaping law); David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature 484–513 (Prome-
theus Books 1992) (1739) (discussing the role of custom in property law). 
202 Cf. Hirtle, supra note 100, at 549 (noting that the Gentlemen’s Agreement, de-
spite its origins as a voluntary guideline, came to be viewed “as a defacto [sic] cap on 
the extent of acceptable reproduction by librarians and researchers”). 
203 Ass’n of Indep. Video & Filmmakers et al., Documentary Filmmakers’ Statement 
of Best Practices in Fair Use 1 (Nov. 18, 2005), available at 
http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/rock/backgrounddocs/bestpractices.pdf (“Fair 
use is shaped, in part, by the practice of the professional communities that employ 
it.”). 
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form courts of the various practices that continue to exceed the 
proposed safe harbor thresholds. 
B. De Minimis 
A second potential criticism of our proposal is that it is unneces-
sary in light of the de minimis doctrine. The doctrine forgives tech-
nical violations of the law where the impact of the transgression is 
so trivial as to be essentially nonexistent.204 Readers familiar with 
the application of the doctrine to copyright law know that this ar-
gument misses the mark. 
The failing of de minimis is that, like fair use itself, it has become 
a vague and unpredictable standard. Courts have applied the doc-
trine in a highly inconsistent fashion, reaching widely divergent re-
sults. Moreover, judges evaluate a claim of de minimis copying not 
just for the quantitative amount of material copied, but also for the 
qualitative amount: if the material represents the “heart” of the 
work, then a court will be far less likely to find that the copying was 
fair or de minimis.205 Content users cannot know, ex ante, how this 
open-ended evaluation may turn out. More to the point, norma-
tively, content users should be allowed to make minor appropria-
tions, even from the qualitative “heart” of a work. Our safe har-
bors would allow this usage in a manner that the de minimis 
doctrine clearly does not. 
A further problem with the de minimis doctrine is that it has 
been construed so narrowly in copyright cases as to render it virtu-
ally meaningless. As Rebecca Tushnet has noted, many of the im-
portant types of uses require that the audience be able to recognize 
the material being copied.206 Yet “a taking is considered de minimis 
only if it is so meager and fragmentary that the average audience 
 
204 See, e.g., On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 172–73 (2d Cir. 2001) (discuss-
ing the de minimis doctrine); Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, 126 F.3d 70, 74–76 
(2d Cir. 1997) (same). 
205 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 548, 564–65 (finding that the three to four hun-
dred words copied constituted the “heart” of the original work); Dun & Bradstreet 
Software Servs. v. Grace Consulting, 307 F.3d 197, 208 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding that de 
minimis did not apply to the copying of twenty-seven lines of code from a 525,000 line 
program because those twenty-seven lines were of high qualitative value). 
206 Tushnet, supra note 26, at 583. 
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would not recognize the appropriation.”207 As a result, de minimis 
will never be available to end-users seeking to quote a short pas-
sage from a book or to play a brief scene from a film. 
For all these reasons, the de minimis doctrine does not provide a 
real alternative to our proposal. As it stands, the doctrine serves no 
substantive function in sheltering users from liability. Due to its 
narrow construction, the doctrine has become a dead letter. Hence, 
there would be nothing lost if it were to be supplanted by our pro-
posal. 
C. Strategic Abuse 
A further concern that might be raised against our proposal is 
that it is susceptible to strategic abuse. To illustrate, consider the 
proposed safe harbor for video clips. If the appropriation of any 
thirty-second segment is a per se fair use, then an individual could 
post the first thirty seconds of a film on her web page and make it 
available to download. Another individual could then post the next 
thirty seconds, and so on.208 In this manner, the entire film could be 
posted online, with little the copyright holder could do to prevent 
members of the public from obtaining the entire film and reassem-
bling it on their own computers.209 
This concern is not as grave as it first appears. Assembling the 
film would exceed the safe harbor and would clearly constitute a 
copyright infringement under traditional fair use analysis. Just as in 
patent law, which has had to deal with similar problems of strategic 
abuse, copyright law provides for causes of action for contributory 
and vicarious liability. In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd., the Supreme Court explicitly adopted the patent 
law approach and held that the active inducement of copyright in-
fringement is actionable.210 Accordingly, any person who would 
seek to coordinate the reassembly of a film, or any other work, 
 
207 Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 435 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986); see also On Davis, 246 F.3d 
at 173 (finding that “the de minimis doctrine is not applicable” because “the infring-
ing item is highly noticeable”). 
208 Arguably, this could even be done by a single individual, claiming that each seg-
ment constituted a different “work.” 
209 This same logic could be applied with equal force to the safe harbors for appro-
priating portions of literary or musical works. 
210 545 U.S. 913, 940–41 (2005). 
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from discrete parts (by, say, providing a list of websites where each 
individual piece could be located) would face potential liability.211 
A separate but related concern is that the creation of these safe 
harbors would artificially alter the course of technological and ar-
tistic development. In light of the Sony decision, for example, file-
sharing services made sure their devices were capable of “substan-
tial non-infringing uses.”212 This suggests that if safe harbors take 
away a certain revenue stream, content owners will likely try 
adapting to recapture it. For example, television networks might 
make their shows available for download in one minute incre-
ments, claiming that each portion is an individual work (and thus 
limiting the amount that could be copied to six seconds per min-
ute). This is not so farfetched: writers for The Simpsons already 
build their episodes around one- to two-minute stand-alone seg-
ments designed to be posted on the Internet,213 and Fox produced a 
spin-off of the television show 24 made up of twenty-four one-
minute episodes that could be downloaded onto cellular phones.214 
Such strategies may require courts to decide what constitutes the 
“total work,” but they do not undermine the safe harbor itself. Fur-
thermore, market forces provide an inherent limitation on the abil-
ity of content providers to manipulate their works and distribute 
them piecemeal. 
D. The Optimal Level of Fair Use 
The final potential objection we wish to address is more general. 
Our analysis so far has proceeded on the assumption that the cur-
 
211 Cf. Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron Co., 248 F.3d 1376, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(citing Fromberg, Inc. v. Thomhill, 315 F.2d 407, 411 (5th Cir. 1963), to argue that the 
term “active inducement” “is as broad as the range of actions by which one in fact 
causes, or urges, or encourages, or aids another to infringe a patent”); Fromberg, 315 
F.2d at 411 n.11 (quoting Walker on Patents 1764–71 (Anthony William Deller ed., 
Supp. 1962), to note that active inducement includes “passing on information intend-
ing to bring about infringement”). 
212 See Jennifer S. Lee, Digital Video Recorders: First, ReplayTV 4000 Must Face 
the Courts, N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 2001, at C3 (noting that the makers of digital video 
recorders made sure that their devices were capable of “substantial noninfringing 
uses”). 
213 Posting of Lonny Pugh to LA.comfidential, http://www.la.com/blog/ 
6541437.html?month=March&year=2007 (Mar. 16, 2007, 01:00 PDT). 
214 Laura M. Holson, Cellphone Content, Straight From the Creators, N.Y. Times, 
Feb. 27, 2006, at C1. 
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rent fair use regime results in too little fair use of copyrighted ex-
pression. This, of course, raises the question of what is the optimal 
level of fair use. Questions of optimum pose a Herculean challenge 
for legal theorists.215 In the patent context, Professor William 
Nordhaus demonstrated that the optimal duration of patent pro-
tection balances the utility of incentives for innovation against the 
costs produced by monopoly-induced deadweight loss.216 Unfortu-
nately, determining where this balance lies in the real world has 
proven to be elusive. Determination of the optimal level of fair use 
would similarly require policymakers to analyze a host of theoretic 
and empirical variables. Even a purely theoretical estimation of the 
optimal level of fair use necessitates complex computations. Pro-
fessor William Fisher, who attempted to establish a framework for 
such a calculus, expressed serious skepticism about the usefulness 
of his analysis for judges.217 
We offer a two-pronged response to this challenge. First, as sev-
eral leading copyright scholars have noted, fair use in its current 
form offers very little protection to speech interests. As Professor 
Neil Netanel observed, “[T]oday’s fair use doctrine provides no 
more than a bare, insubstantial trace of that protection [of First 
Amendment interests].”218 If we think that fair use is valuable at all 
in safeguarding these interests,219 it is hard to justify a doctrine that 
provides protection in name only. 
Second, and more importantly, we posit that our proposal is 
beneficial irrespective of whatever the optimal level of fair use 
might be. The establishment of fair use harbors would reduce the 
ambiguity that surrounds the current doctrine. Regardless of one’s 
opinion on the optimal level of fair use, it is advantageous to clear 
the doctrine of unnecessary ambiguity. Ambiguity distorts fair use: 
it favors risk-seeking users and disfavors risk-averse ones. It should 
be noted in this regard that some commentators have estimated 
 
215 For discussion of this challenge in a more general property context, see Abraham 
Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 Cornell L. Rev. 531 (2005). 
216 William D. Nordhaus, Invention, Growth, and Welfare: A Theoretical Treatment 
of Technological Change 76–86 (1969). 
217 Fisher, supra note 201, at 1718 (cautioning that “[i]t is hard to imagine a judge 
making even rough guesses at some of the figures critical to the calculus”). 
218 Netanel, supra note 186, at 23. 
219 Cf. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219–20 (2003) (describing fair use as a First 
Amendment safeguard). 
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that most users are indeed risk averse.220 Whether this assessment is 
correct is ultimately an empirical question. Irrespective of the total 
number, though, there is no good policy or textual reason to favor 
risk-seeking users. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Essay, we have presented the case for establishing a sys-
tem of fair use safe harbors and demonstrated how this system 
might be implemented. The benefits stemming from our proposal 
are substantial. A system of safe harbors would introduce much-
needed certainty into this important doctrine. It would enable us-
ers to reproduce certain quantities of copyrighted expression with-
out fear of liability, turning many would-be users from potential in-
fringers (or reluctant abstainers) into legitimate, productive 
borrowers. These changes are especially desirable in an era when 
an increasing amount of content is produced by laypersons outside 
the traditional copyright industries, and the creative culture relies 
on borrowing from preexisting material. The incremental nature of 
artistic creativity suggests that allowing limited safe harbor access 
to expressive building blocks may enhance, rather than retard, the 
production of new works. 
Naturally, not everyone will benefit from the proposed change. 
As Judge Guido Calabresi famously observed, virtually every move 
from the status quo will work to someone’s disadvantage.221 Some 
content owners will oppose any change in the current fair use re-
gime. Yet it is the overall effect that should count, and that is likely 
to be positive. What is more, our proposal also holds the key to re-
vitalizing fair use in the digital age, thereby restoring the intended 
balance of copyright law. 
 
 
220 See Gibson, supra note 16, at 887. 
221 Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 Yale 
L.J. 1211, 1212 (1991). 
